Democracy: A politically comparative tool, with reference to the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation.

Democracy, from the ancient Greek demokratia, has come a long way from it’s Athenian origins. In the 21^st century, we live in an age when the majority of the planet’s population lives under some form of democratic rule. However, democracy as defined by the early Greek model, between 461 and 322 BC, has come to take on a multifaceted meaning and function (Hague and Harrop, 2007).

Contemporarily, democracy can be understood as a procedure, as it has been from it’s origins; a way of governing. Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address extolled the virtues of modern democracy celebrating the “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (1864; Heywood, 2000).  However, moreover from the right to representation, some forms of democracy are understood to represent certain goals for society, James Laxar writes:

“Essential features of contemporary democracy are the rights to free speech and assembly. Democracy also extends to the rule of law, to the right of those accused of crimes to fair and speedy trials, to freedom from arbitrary detention and the right to legal counsel.”

(Laxar,p10, 2010)

These democratic goals detailed by Laxar exemplify the role of democracy in the 21^st century as much more than the right to vote.  However, this very basic feature of modern democracy, suffrage, has developed greatly from it’s Greek origins.

Demokratia, meaning rule (kratos) by the people (demos) was literally translated in to the direct democracy of Athens. Citizens could attend assembly meetings and vote upon their content, serve on the governing council and sit on citizen juries in the People’s courts. The right to become involved in the Executive (assembly), Legislature (council) and Judiciary (courts) signified near complete involvement in political life. However, citizenship was only bestowed upon the male Athenians who had completed their military training, excluding foreign residents, women and slaves (Finley, 1985). Although the direct democracy of Athens is retrospectively criticised for it’s exclusivity and cumbersome processes, it’s contribution to the formation of modern democracy, indeed the founding of it, is exemplified by two factors: the invention of the citizen, rather than the subject, and the democratic voting process. From these two key features, modern democracies have flourished (Finer, 1997). 

In 2011, no direct-democratic state exists; instead, representative democracy and elected governments have become common place.  The election of an executive and a legislature,  via means of public vote, open to all citizens, has become of increasing necessity throughout time as larger modern states emerge, requiring a form of democracy representative of far greater numbers of citizens. The direct democracy of Athens amassed a total of around forty thousand citizens in 322 BC, in the year 2000 AD, India’s representative democracy exceeded one billion.

However, not all representative democracies are similar. Liberal democracies are constitutionally limited in order to secure citizens’ individual liberty and protection from tyranny by majority, clearly relating to what Laxar describes as the “essential features of contemporary democracy” (Laxar, p10,2010; Held, 2006).  This polyarchic form of democracy can take many forms; it may be a constitutional republic, such as the United States or Germany, or a constitutional monarchy, such as the United Kingdom or Spain, and it may implement a presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary system of representation. 

Opposingly, illiberal democracies uphold few rights other than suffrage. Weak judiciaries allow governments to rule with few limits and a disregard for civil liberties. Interference in the marketplace is common, as is indoctrinated media coverage, and harassment of political opponents. All features used to nullify any need to interfere with the physical voting process.  Such behaviour has led to certain commentators to describe illiberal democracies as “electoral or competitive authoritarianism” (Hague & Harrop, p51, 2007; Korosteleva, 2004; Schedler, 2006). These illiberal democracies tend to arise where democracy is a new phenomenon, Zakaria writes; “since the fall of communism, countries around the world are being governed by regimes like Russia’s that mix elections and authoritarianism” (p61, 2003).  However, many believe that illiberal democracy is the first step on the road to increased democracy, such as liberal democracy (LeDuc, Niemi & Norris, 2010).

Somewhere in between direct democracy and representative democracy, specifically representative liberal democracy, lays deliberative democracy. Simply, deliberative democracy promotes the involvement of citizens in law making. A contemporary example of deliberative democracy in action is the G1000 Citizen’s Summit in Belgium, November 2011. At the time of the summit Belgium’s representative democracy had been without government for over five hundred days, a result of budget, immigration and voting issues.  This lead to the G1000 group’s formulation by independent citizens, none of whom were politicians, and the random sampling of 1000 Belgians to meet and discuss the nation’s major concerns, with the resulting suggestions later formulated in to policy proposals (Vermeesch, 2011). This pilot scheme of Belgian deliberative democracy called upon the work of American political thinker Ethan Leib (2004) and was undertaken with a view to becoming integrated into the representative model, calling upon the views and expertise of the electorate alongside the already established political landscape. 

From these various definitions of democracy we understand that when comparing nations upon a democratic basis we must first look at the phenomenon’s most longstanding   feature; the democratic voting process (LeDuc, Niemi & Norris, 2010). 

In the recent December (2011) parliamentary elections in Russia, 60% voter turnout was reported, a drop of 4% from the 2007 elections (IDEA RF, 2011). Comparatively, voter turnouts for the United Kingdom’s parliamentary elections have scored similarly in recent years; 61% in 2005 and 66% in 2010 (IDEA UK ,2011).

Although the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system, and Russia is a constitutional semi-presidential federal republic, we understand both to be representative democracies, and upon the first investigations of democratic comparison, they appear very much alike with similar levels of voter turnout in recent parliamentary elections.

However, a look beyond the turnout of these elections and in to the underlying quantitative details reveals much more. The 2007 Russian parliamentary, or Duma, elections re-elected President Putin’s United Russia with a 64% share of the vote. In comparison the British General Election of 2010 afforded the party with the highest percentage of votes, much less. The Conservative party gained only 36% of the total number of votes made. Their two closest rivals, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats earned 29% and 23% respectively, indicating a much tighter contest than that of the Duma election. It is also worthy of note that a further nine parties gained or maintained representation in the House of Commons, taking the total to twelve. Only four parties earned representation in Russia in 2007. 

Finally with regards to the democratic voting process, electoral reliability is steadfast in twenty-first century Britain and has been so for many years. Despite opposition, as in Russia, and many other representative democracies of the electoral system (Britain uses the first past the post system in parliamentary elections, Russia uses proportional representation), citizens in the United Kingdom understand the voting process to be free from corruption. Conversely, allegations of rigging have marred election results in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The Guardian Newspaper wrote on the 5^th December 2011, of the recent elections:

“Russians continued to register alleged cases of falsification on Monday, and news reports on state television appeared to show results that implied turnout in some regions was as high as 146%.”

(Elder, 2011)

In comparison with the greatest allegations of results fixing in the United Kingdom in 2010- the denial of a number of citizens’ opportunity to vote in certain areas, most notably Sheffield Hallam, due to surpassing the 10pm deadline- these accusations of government intervention call in to question Russia’s democratic state (Weaver, 2010). 

However, we are aware that there is more to the phenomenon of democracy than the process of voting. Further to suffrage, liberal democracies protect the rights of citizens and limit the power of the elected, whereas such assurances are not offered by their illiberal counterparts. As such we recognise the United Kingdom to be an example of a modern liberal democracy. Laxar’s aforementioned features of contemporary democracy, such as free speech, free association, and the right to a fair trial, are keenly protected by a strong judiciary, enshrined in constitutional and sovereign European law.  Further to this a free market economy is maintained, with little government intervention. Free media operates, both public and private, insuring public discussion and opposition to government is available to all. Increased involvement in the legislative process is also emerging in Britain. The e-petitions service was introduced midway through 2011, allowing citizens to create online petitions with a view to directly influencing government policy via debate in House of Commons (Herlihy, 2011).

Opposingly, Russia is understood to formulate a type of illiberal democracy, with some accusations that this status is of too higher praise. Yet certain features of the civil liberties described as enshrined in the United Kingdom, are indeed active in Russia to some extents. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the introduction of the federalist republic, rights to free speech, association and fair trial dramatically increased by the standards which had previously been in place. However, such liberties in 21^st century Russia appear to fall dramatically short of what is deemed to be internationally acceptable behaviour for a liberal state. In 2008, an Amnesty International report on Russia suggested that freedom of speech in the country was shrinking at an alarming rate under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. In summary the Freedom Limited report detailed the most significant examples, saying “murders of outspoken journalists go unsolved, independent media outlets have been shut and police have attacked protestors” (BBC, 2008).  

The centralisation of power in Russia is exemplified by the stronghold of the former President and current Prime Minister. Elected to the Presidency in 2000, Vladimir Putin remained the incumbent for the maximum of two consecutive terms, totalling eight years. Upon his departure, his replacement, Dmitry Medvedev, Putin’s preferred candidate also of the United Russia party, nominated the former President to the role of Prime Minister. This move was then approved by the Duma, in which the United Russia party held a two-thirds majority.  This majority also later ratified the first amendments of the Russian constitution since it’s introduction in 1993 by approving the proposal to extend the presidential term from four to six year, securing the party’s grip on the Kremlin (Rossi, 2008). An extraordinary extension of Putin’s personal power was revealed in September 2011 when he revealed that he had accepted a proposal to stand for the presidency once again, and undertake a potential further twelve years as President, only four years after exiting the role. He also suggested that he would elect Medvedev as his Prime Minister (Economist, 2011; BBC, 2011). Critics of Putin suggest that he has enjoyed unparalleled levels of power throughout his career. Vladimir Ryzkhov, a Kremlin opponent said in 2008:

“The tsar was constrained by the aristocracy. The party bureaucracy controlled the general secretary. Today the president (Putin was President at the time of comment) controls parliament, the senate, regions, the bureaucracy and the security services, as well as oil and gas”

(Harding, 2008)

As we have come to appreciate, where democracy is concerned, there is often more to see than initially meets the eye. The United Russia party has near monopolised Russian political power in recent times, but at least in basic terms, this is not unfamiliar to the longstanding political governance we have seen in Britain in the 20^th and 21^st century. For eighteen years between 1979 and 1997, the Conservative party maintained a majority strong enough to form a government in the United Kingdom, and the following New Labour establishment remained in office for a further thirteen years between 1997 and 2010.  If, like the Russian system, the term of President, or in Britain’s case Prime Minister, was a constitutionally limited timeframe, this may not have been possible.

Unlike Russia’s constitution, the United Kingdom’s has in recent times had it’s sovereign status called in to question.  Through European Union membership, Britain foregoes certain law making powers, relinquishing them to the European courts. Although certain aspects of this are seen to increase democratic status, for example the full implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights in to British law via the Human Rights Act 1998, increasing civil liberties in the UK, the surrender of sovereign legislative authority, entrusted in parliament via means of a public mandate, is seen to undermine the electoral process in Britain.  In 2010, thirty million British citizens took to the polling station to elect a government, one year prior to that, half of that number voted in European Parliament elections, representing 34% of the electorate.

Moreover from democracy, several other aspects of political comparison could lead us to determine varied conclusions on any nation. With regards to the United Kingdom and Russia, aspects such as devolution, race, ethnicity and religion could be used to portray an in depth analysis of the two. Russia’s federalist republic is of a vast political scale, comprising eighty three subject states ranging from the Ural district of Udmurt to the Siberian state of Tomsk Oblast.  Conversely, the United Kingdom consists of four nations; England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The varying degree to which centralised power in both Russia and the UK is devolved to these bodies is immensely different. Similarly, the ethnic, racial and religious diversity of these two states is particularly converse, as are the issues surrounding them. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the initial emergence of fifteen new independent states, such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, very great ethnic conflict occurred in both of the named states, as well as in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia (Heywood, 2007). Issues of race, religion and ethnicity in Britain have also been prominent in recent times. For the latter half of the 20^th, and into the 21^st century, Britain suffered great threat from Irish Republicanism. However, following the turn of the millennium an increasing focus has been placed upon the threat of Islamic extremism.

As a politically comparative tool, democracy has come to reveal much more than the voter turnout of the nations in hand, instead deeply investigating the rights and liberties of a nation’s citizens, whether it be the right to free speech, the right to stand as a presidential candidate, or the right to propose a petition. We have come to understand the phenomenon of democracy to be a complex one, and no form of democratic state can simply be defined as good or bad.  Some are broadly similar with regards to the civil liberties they appear to protect or not protect, and this has led to the established terminology of “liberal” and “illiberal” democracies; however within these categories fall many greater distinctions.  In conclusion, used as a tool for comparison, democracy has proved to be an overarching one; delving in to many greater aspects of a nation’s politics than it superficially appears to. 

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500 words on: Too big to fail banks.

Three years after bailing out one of America’s, and indeed the world’s biggest banks; Citigroup, “too big to fail banks” were back on the senate’s agenda last week when senator for Ohio, Sherrod Brown, presented his case to the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection.  In April 2010, Brown, alongside fellow Democratic Senator Ted Kaufman sponsored a failed measure proposing the attenuation of the United States’ “megabanks” and last week reiterated his desire to break up the monopoly of what he describes as the indestructible Wall Street Behemoths (Keoun & Ivry, 2011). Brown suggests that the largest banks in America are currently in a situation by which they cannot be allowed to fail as the results would be too catastrophic for the economy to handle, as such the government will always intervene, or bailout, these banks at the prolonged expense of the tax payer. This notion clearly relates to the aforementioned bailout of Citigroup, and that of Bank of America in 2009 (BBC News, 2009; Kiviate, 2008; Propublica, 2010).

In comparison to the United States, Lydia Prieg suggests that the United Kingdom is even more exposed to the banking sector; financial sector assets in relation to GDP are higher in Britain than in the US, Canada, France and Germany. Prieg furthers her claim of British exposure when she writes “In 2009 , the UK pledged 101% of UK GDP in support of the banking sector, in comparison to the US's 42% of GDP, Germany's 27% of GDP, and Japan's 21% of GDP” (Prieg, 2011). The pledged support mentioned, surpassing the UK’s GDP IN 2009, was accumulated in the bailing out of several British banks in 2008. Firstly, the February nationalisation of Northern Rock, followed seven months later by the recuse of Bradford and Bingley in September,  and finally only two weeks later in October,  the decision to inject a combined total of £37bn into the Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Lloyds TSB in order to prevent the British banking system from imploding (The Telegraph, 2009).

When analysing these bailouts and those of the American banks we understand one thing; all had retail banking components, and as such are responsible for the management of millions of the general public’s bank accounts. By owning such a large share of the market, Brown and Prieg suggest these banks were too big to be allowed to fail by government. But the billion dollar bailouts did not become a necessity due to the actions of retail bank managers in Memphis or Macclesfield, instead they were required as a result of the very same banks’ investment activities. This style of casino banking; taking from the retail hand to feed the investment hand’s reckless gambling, has come under great scrutiny throughout the banking crises and has led to great support for the ring-fencing of the retail and investment sectors, if not total separation (Today, 2009; Prieg, 2011).

However, it is worth noting that one key bank involved in the banking crises did not have a retail arm; Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008 instigated the sale of Merill Lynch to Bank of America, resulting one year later in the Bank of America bailout (BBC News, 2008). This incestuous description of retail and investment banking exemplifies the reasoning  behind calls to cap the sizes of all banks as called for by Senator Brown and Lydia Prieg.

In conclusion, we can see of the various banks discussed, those involved in retail and investment banking mutually, have not been allowed to fail by either the American or British government, saved by taxpayers money in order protect the banking system, as well as the taxpayers themselves. However, Lehmann Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the United States in 2008 was not saved, with the repercussions spreading  in to every aspect of finance, including the protected retail banking sector. This would suggest that whilst some banks were understood to be too big to fail, such as Citigroup in the US, and Northern Rock in the UK, some banks, such as Lehmann brothers, were simply too big for the economy. 

 Bibliography

Control Orders: An introduction to the policy.

The initial proposal for ‘control orders’ was introduced by the Labour government in 2005 via the Prevention of Terrorism Bill and was seen at the time as a preventative measure against an increased threat of international terrorism in the United Kingdom. Following the September 11^th attacks in the United States in 2001, the subsequent invasions of both Afghanistan, also in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, was understood to have greatly increased the danger of an attack by extreme Islamist groups on UK soil (Marsden, 2010; Great Britain Bill, 2005).

Control orders seek to restrict the actions of suspects involved in “terrorism-related activity” as defined by the Terrorism Act 2000; they apply to both British and international persons, whom cannot be prosecuted or deported (Great Britain, 2000, Great Britain R.P., 2005). The orders seek to curb the activities of suspects whilst not incarcerating them. An initial research paper stated:

“This Bill allows the Secretary of State to make ‘control orders’ to restrict the movements or behaviour of suspected terrorists who cannot be prosecuted or deported, or impose obligations on them. The orders would be subject to some judicial oversight. Orders which amounted to an infringement of liberty would require a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights to be in force.”

(Great Britain R.P., p1, 2005)

The means by which the Home Secretary can “restrict the movements or behaviour of suspected terrorists” are explicitly detailed in the Bill and it’s research papers, and have also been summarised by the BBC:

The Bill Says:	The BBC Says:
Prohibitions or restrictions on the possession of specified articles, use of specified services or facilities, or carrying on specified activities	E.g. No internet
Controls on whom he may associate with	E.g. Restrictions on visitors, Attend only one mosque
Restrictions or prohibitions on movement	E.g. Curfews
Controls on an individual’s place of residence or place of work	E.g. Live at one address
Other restrictions on their ability to travel including surrender of passports;	E.g. No passport
Duty to allow searches and comply with monitoring and reporting requirements including electronic tagging; Duty to supply information	E.g. Electronic tagging, Daily reporting to the police, Daily monitoring by phone

(Great Britain R.P., p24, 2005; Great Britain Bill, 2005; Casciani, 2011)

The orders take two different forms, both of which if breached result in a criminal offence.  A “non- derogation order” lasts for one year, implementing several of the lesser restrictions such as curfews and bans on whom the suspect may be in contact with. This form of control order does not implicate Britain’s relationship with the European Union as it is not in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). A “derogation order” would “infringe the right to liberty” by means of such restrictions as house arrest, and as such would call into question this relationship as it would involve opting out of Article 5 ECHR (Hanman, 2009; Great Britain R.P., 2005; Great Britain Bill, 2005).

Significantly, suspects accused of “terrorism-related activity” and subsequently issued with a control order are not to be informed of allegations against them, in order to maintain privacy of sensitive information, otherwise known as “secret evidence”.  They are allowed to be represented by a lawyer, known as their “special advocate”, whom has access to the evidence along with the judge, but from which point on their contact with the accused is limited to monitored written correspondence, so as to maintain secrecy (Wagner, 2011).

The Home Secretary at the time of the bill’s introduction, Charles Clarke, issued a statement spelling out the government’s objectives for control orders as to protect the public from the threat of terrorism. He stated that “orders would be preventive and designed to disrupt those seeking to carry out attacks—whether here or elsewhere—or who are planning or otherwise supporting such activities” (Great Britain R.P.,p15, 2005). Prime Minister, Tony Blair reiterated the importance of the policy and public safety when his spokesperson said “The government has not put forward its proposals lightly” (BBC, 2005).  

The policy was met with initial criticism from human rights organisations and opposition parties who suggested the government had hidden objectives of replacing previous laws, which had been illegalised, with legislation which could also be interpreted as illegal. Liberty, the civil liberties and human rights organisation commented robustly against control orders, stating: “Eight hundred years of the right to a fair trial in this country could be overturned within fourteen days” (Great Britain R.P., p19,2005). Similarly, Michael Howard, leader of the Conservative party refuted the notion; a Tory press release called for a suspects innocence or guilt to be decided by the courts, continuing “ If they are found guilty, they must be detained in a prison cell, not their living rooms” (Great Britain R.P.,p17, 2005).

The history surrounding the introduction of the control order policy to the agenda by the government in 2005 is complex.  Following the September 11^th attacks, new counter-terrorism legislation was introduced in Britain under a strategy known as CONTEST (Simcox,p18, 2010). The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 was passed in November 2001 as emergency legislation and detailed, in Part 4, that a foreign national suspected of “terrorism related activity” could be imprisoned indefinitely without charge or trial if they could not be deported. However, three years later in December 2004, the House of Lords made a declaration of incompatibility as they believed the law to breach the ‘right to liberty’ under the ECHR. The Law Lords proposed that the law was not “strictly necessary”, as must be the case for an EU nation to opt out of any clause of the Human Rights Act. They believed this was demonstrated by the fact that it applied only to foreign nationals. This lead the government to repeal Part 4 of the Act, and propose a replacement policy: control orders (Liberty, 2005; Great Britain, 2001).

The first outline of the policy to the House of Commons, media, and the overall agenda was one of considerable speed; The Prevention of Terrorism Bill was announced in a Business Statement on Monday 21 February 2005, listing it for debate only two days later, Wednesday 23 February, and final Committee stages on Monday 28 February. The rushed nature of the policy produced much distain from opponents.

We understand that control orders reached the public agenda as the result of another policy; indefinite detention, being repealed as a result of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. This direct impact on policy formulation exemplifies a strong influence by the EU on what policies reach the agenda, and what can actually be implemented.

Other influences aside from those involved in the formulation of the policy, have clearly influenced it’s evolution; Labour’s manifesto promise in 1997 of being “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” meant that not only were the Labour government looking to reduce crime levels, but to halt the formulation of criminal activity (Labour, 1997). Conjoined with the increased threat from terror following September 11^th, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the government looked to maintain this strong ideological stance on criminality (Labour, 1997; BBC, 2010; Marsden, 2010). In 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair described the role of Britain as to “try to find a way through this: to construct a consensus behind a broad agenda of justice and security and means of enforcing it” (BBC, 2004).

We can see that many aspects have influenced the evolution of the control order policy reaching the agenda: international crises, failure of legislation and European sovereignty have proved most prominent. These series of events relate to what Anderson believes explains the appearance of any policy on the agenda; suggesting that crises or spectacular events, such as the Iraq war, draw wide attention to a policy area, and become of particular importance when a group, in this instance the British public, are threatened. He also believes that when the Executive, that is the leadership of the government, becomes concerned with a policy area it is inevitable that it will reach the agenda in some form or another (Anderson, 1984).

In this sense, Anderson’s model of a number of factors coming together corresponds with Lindblom’s suggestion that the policy process is one of gradual change and growth; the “science of muddling through” (Hudson & Lowe, p7, 2009; Lindblom, 1979).  This incremental approach towards the policy process rather than one of rational decision making, as suggested by Lasswell, is less idealistic and aims to develop policy in a reactionary fashion, as is the case with control orders (Hudson & Lowe, 2009). As such Linblom’s model correlates with the New Labour government’s overarching ideology of Realpolitik, addressing issues with a realist perspective guided by Gidden’s ‘Third Way’ (Heywood, 2007).  

However, a more structured view of the issues which arise in the evolution of any policy is detailed by Kingdon who believes that amongst the “muddle” described by Linblom and the contributing factors mentioned by Anderson, there must always be three prominent factors. The   ‘multiple stream model’ proposed that in order for a policy to reach the agenda, three ‘streams’ must prevail; the problem stream, policy stream and political stream.  The problem stream produces the issues that need resolving; the policy stream produces answers to such issues; and finally the political stream produces the correct circumstances for new policy change. In the instance of control order policy, this would be viewed as follows:

Problem Stream - Repealment of Part 4, Anti-Terrorism Act 2001.

Policy Stream- Proposal to replace indfefinite detention with 'control orders'.

Political Stream- A desire to protect the public from terror suspects, and maintain a tough ideological stance on crime.

The ‘political stream’ of any policy can be linked to what Hudson and Lowe describe as “ideological paradigms” i.e. the political circumstances must suit the government’s ideology for the policy to reach the agenda. A strong stance on crime and anti-terrorism were clearly part of the Labour government’s ideological paradigm at the time.

Finally, it is worth noting that political power, leadership and decision making have clearly influenced the evolution of the control orders policy. Weber’s description of a strong charismatic leadership have been demonstrated by both the Prime Minister Tony Blair and Home Secretary Charles Clarke (Hudson & Lowe, 2009). Their actions also correlate with Houghton’s description of how political leaders make “big decisions during times of crises” in accordance with historical and personal events (Hudson & Lowe, p231, 2009). In this instance the initial introduction of indefinite detention, which they did not wish to be repealed, lead them to introduce what they believed was the best alternative. Outside influence on the policy’s formulation has been limited, demonstrating centralised decision making which has clearly been influenced by a strong government standing in parliament. The Labour government held a majority of 66 in 2005, resulting in the ability to table unpopular policies, such as control orders, and still believe in their ability to press them through.

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500 words on: Free trade policy- is it for everyone?

Free market capitalism is based upon the premise that private individuals rather than the state make the best economic decisions. By confining the role of the government to protecting private property, maintaining law and order and shielding the system from external exaggeration, this laissez-faire policy of facilitation, rather than regulation; reduces the role of the state to that of the ‘night watchman’, leaving the ‘invisible hand’ of the market to be the controlling force (Marron, 2010).

Just as the free market is facilitated by a reduced state, the free market facilitates free trade. In an international sense the free market economy is accepted as widespread, meaning international trade is a truly globalising factor. Under a free trade policy, prices emerge from supply and demand as one nation’s economy interacts with many others. Twentieth century economist and academic Friedrich van Hayek wrote:

“It is necessary in the first instance that the parties in the market should be free to sell and buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction, and that anybody should be free to produce, sell, and buy anything that may be produced and sold at all”.

(1944,p37)

Furthermore, nineteenth century economist David Ricardo continued the work of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in advocating free trade suggesting that there is mutual benefit as long as nations focus on the areas where they have “relative productivity advantage” (Arnold and McGauley , 2011).  A modern example would be the comparative advantage of Western nations in the field of the finance and service industry and that off South-East Asian nations on production. Essentially, nations should specialise.  With these thoughts in mind, advocates of free trade believe it can ensure maximum prosperity across the globe (Sachs, 2005).

Some critics of free trade policy call in to question Ricardo’s belief in mutually beneficial trading through specialisation, suggesting that such a situation creates little economic mobility. A common example of this is known as the ‘agriculture problem’. As people become wealthier their desire to buy high-spec goods increase, generally produced in well-developed nations. However, as people become wealthier they do not become hungrier, at least not literally, and food production remains the same. Comparably the wealthy nation continues to gain wealth, and the poorer nation remains stagnant (Oxfam, 2011).

Moreover from the idealistic criticism of free trade policy is the realist criticism that free trade does not actually exist. The removal of the state from economic decisions is integral to developing a full and beneficial free market place; critics suggest that in actuality, this does not exist. Through trading agreements countries approve a number of criteria; tariff reductions for example, so as to increase economical interaction and create a trading bloc. This comes at the expense of other nations trading in to that bloc, who become  over-priced through tariff increases to non-trading bloc members, undersold by tariff reduction to trading bloc members and even withdrawn by quotas on nations outside of the trading bloc (Cohen, 2008). Oxfam suggests that through trade diversion, some of the world’s wealthiest nations protect themselves from the free market they preach, the consequences of which for developing nations are dire. (Oxfam, 2011; CHUA, 2004).

When drawing conclusion on whether free trade policy works for all countries, we must consider what in reality free trade is, and what form of international trading we currently undertake. As the originally free market- and consequently developed- economies of the West have introduced trading agreements, they have since become common place, disqualifying many nations from the market. This form of ‘mixed economy’ rather than free market is what leads to the most intense criticism. In it’s current form free trade policy clearly does not work for every nation, this is why discussions on global tariff reduction such as the recent Doha round are of great importance.  Supporters believe that a freer free market and resulting freer free trade can work for all nations.

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