Control Orders: An introduction to the policy.

The initial proposal for ‘control orders’ was introduced by the Labour government in 2005 via the Prevention of Terrorism Bill and was seen at the time as a preventative measure against an increased threat of international terrorism in the United Kingdom. Following the September 11^th attacks in the United States in 2001, the subsequent invasions of both Afghanistan, also in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, was understood to have greatly increased the danger of an attack by extreme Islamist groups on UK soil (Marsden, 2010; Great Britain Bill, 2005).

Control orders seek to restrict the actions of suspects involved in “terrorism-related activity” as defined by the Terrorism Act 2000; they apply to both British and international persons, whom cannot be prosecuted or deported (Great Britain, 2000, Great Britain R.P., 2005). The orders seek to curb the activities of suspects whilst not incarcerating them. An initial research paper stated:

“This Bill allows the Secretary of State to make ‘control orders’ to restrict the movements or behaviour of suspected terrorists who cannot be prosecuted or deported, or impose obligations on them. The orders would be subject to some judicial oversight. Orders which amounted to an infringement of liberty would require a derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights to be in force.”

(Great Britain R.P., p1, 2005)

The means by which the Home Secretary can “restrict the movements or behaviour of suspected terrorists” are explicitly detailed in the Bill and it’s research papers, and have also been summarised by the BBC:

The Bill Says:	The BBC Says:
Prohibitions or restrictions on the possession of specified articles, use of specified services or facilities, or carrying on specified activities	E.g. No internet
Controls on whom he may associate with	E.g. Restrictions on visitors, Attend only one mosque
Restrictions or prohibitions on movement	E.g. Curfews
Controls on an individual’s place of residence or place of work	E.g. Live at one address
Other restrictions on their ability to travel including surrender of passports;	E.g. No passport
Duty to allow searches and comply with monitoring and reporting requirements including electronic tagging; Duty to supply information	E.g. Electronic tagging, Daily reporting to the police, Daily monitoring by phone

(Great Britain R.P., p24, 2005; Great Britain Bill, 2005; Casciani, 2011)

The orders take two different forms, both of which if breached result in a criminal offence.  A “non- derogation order” lasts for one year, implementing several of the lesser restrictions such as curfews and bans on whom the suspect may be in contact with. This form of control order does not implicate Britain’s relationship with the European Union as it is not in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). A “derogation order” would “infringe the right to liberty” by means of such restrictions as house arrest, and as such would call into question this relationship as it would involve opting out of Article 5 ECHR (Hanman, 2009; Great Britain R.P., 2005; Great Britain Bill, 2005).

Significantly, suspects accused of “terrorism-related activity” and subsequently issued with a control order are not to be informed of allegations against them, in order to maintain privacy of sensitive information, otherwise known as “secret evidence”.  They are allowed to be represented by a lawyer, known as their “special advocate”, whom has access to the evidence along with the judge, but from which point on their contact with the accused is limited to monitored written correspondence, so as to maintain secrecy (Wagner, 2011).

The Home Secretary at the time of the bill’s introduction, Charles Clarke, issued a statement spelling out the government’s objectives for control orders as to protect the public from the threat of terrorism. He stated that “orders would be preventive and designed to disrupt those seeking to carry out attacks—whether here or elsewhere—or who are planning or otherwise supporting such activities” (Great Britain R.P.,p15, 2005). Prime Minister, Tony Blair reiterated the importance of the policy and public safety when his spokesperson said “The government has not put forward its proposals lightly” (BBC, 2005).  

The policy was met with initial criticism from human rights organisations and opposition parties who suggested the government had hidden objectives of replacing previous laws, which had been illegalised, with legislation which could also be interpreted as illegal. Liberty, the civil liberties and human rights organisation commented robustly against control orders, stating: “Eight hundred years of the right to a fair trial in this country could be overturned within fourteen days” (Great Britain R.P., p19,2005). Similarly, Michael Howard, leader of the Conservative party refuted the notion; a Tory press release called for a suspects innocence or guilt to be decided by the courts, continuing “ If they are found guilty, they must be detained in a prison cell, not their living rooms” (Great Britain R.P.,p17, 2005).

The history surrounding the introduction of the control order policy to the agenda by the government in 2005 is complex.  Following the September 11^th attacks, new counter-terrorism legislation was introduced in Britain under a strategy known as CONTEST (Simcox,p18, 2010). The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 was passed in November 2001 as emergency legislation and detailed, in Part 4, that a foreign national suspected of “terrorism related activity” could be imprisoned indefinitely without charge or trial if they could not be deported. However, three years later in December 2004, the House of Lords made a declaration of incompatibility as they believed the law to breach the ‘right to liberty’ under the ECHR. The Law Lords proposed that the law was not “strictly necessary”, as must be the case for an EU nation to opt out of any clause of the Human Rights Act. They believed this was demonstrated by the fact that it applied only to foreign nationals. This lead the government to repeal Part 4 of the Act, and propose a replacement policy: control orders (Liberty, 2005; Great Britain, 2001).

The first outline of the policy to the House of Commons, media, and the overall agenda was one of considerable speed; The Prevention of Terrorism Bill was announced in a Business Statement on Monday 21 February 2005, listing it for debate only two days later, Wednesday 23 February, and final Committee stages on Monday 28 February. The rushed nature of the policy produced much distain from opponents.

We understand that control orders reached the public agenda as the result of another policy; indefinite detention, being repealed as a result of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. This direct impact on policy formulation exemplifies a strong influence by the EU on what policies reach the agenda, and what can actually be implemented.

Other influences aside from those involved in the formulation of the policy, have clearly influenced it’s evolution; Labour’s manifesto promise in 1997 of being “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime” meant that not only were the Labour government looking to reduce crime levels, but to halt the formulation of criminal activity (Labour, 1997). Conjoined with the increased threat from terror following September 11^th, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the government looked to maintain this strong ideological stance on criminality (Labour, 1997; BBC, 2010; Marsden, 2010). In 2004, Prime Minister Tony Blair described the role of Britain as to “try to find a way through this: to construct a consensus behind a broad agenda of justice and security and means of enforcing it” (BBC, 2004).

We can see that many aspects have influenced the evolution of the control order policy reaching the agenda: international crises, failure of legislation and European sovereignty have proved most prominent. These series of events relate to what Anderson believes explains the appearance of any policy on the agenda; suggesting that crises or spectacular events, such as the Iraq war, draw wide attention to a policy area, and become of particular importance when a group, in this instance the British public, are threatened. He also believes that when the Executive, that is the leadership of the government, becomes concerned with a policy area it is inevitable that it will reach the agenda in some form or another (Anderson, 1984).

In this sense, Anderson’s model of a number of factors coming together corresponds with Lindblom’s suggestion that the policy process is one of gradual change and growth; the “science of muddling through” (Hudson & Lowe, p7, 2009; Lindblom, 1979).  This incremental approach towards the policy process rather than one of rational decision making, as suggested by Lasswell, is less idealistic and aims to develop policy in a reactionary fashion, as is the case with control orders (Hudson & Lowe, 2009). As such Linblom’s model correlates with the New Labour government’s overarching ideology of Realpolitik, addressing issues with a realist perspective guided by Gidden’s ‘Third Way’ (Heywood, 2007).  

However, a more structured view of the issues which arise in the evolution of any policy is detailed by Kingdon who believes that amongst the “muddle” described by Linblom and the contributing factors mentioned by Anderson, there must always be three prominent factors. The   ‘multiple stream model’ proposed that in order for a policy to reach the agenda, three ‘streams’ must prevail; the problem stream, policy stream and political stream.  The problem stream produces the issues that need resolving; the policy stream produces answers to such issues; and finally the political stream produces the correct circumstances for new policy change. In the instance of control order policy, this would be viewed as follows:

Problem Stream - Repealment of Part 4, Anti-Terrorism Act 2001.

Policy Stream- Proposal to replace indfefinite detention with 'control orders'.

Political Stream- A desire to protect the public from terror suspects, and maintain a tough ideological stance on crime.

The ‘political stream’ of any policy can be linked to what Hudson and Lowe describe as “ideological paradigms” i.e. the political circumstances must suit the government’s ideology for the policy to reach the agenda. A strong stance on crime and anti-terrorism were clearly part of the Labour government’s ideological paradigm at the time.

Finally, it is worth noting that political power, leadership and decision making have clearly influenced the evolution of the control orders policy. Weber’s description of a strong charismatic leadership have been demonstrated by both the Prime Minister Tony Blair and Home Secretary Charles Clarke (Hudson & Lowe, 2009). Their actions also correlate with Houghton’s description of how political leaders make “big decisions during times of crises” in accordance with historical and personal events (Hudson & Lowe, p231, 2009). In this instance the initial introduction of indefinite detention, which they did not wish to be repealed, lead them to introduce what they believed was the best alternative. Outside influence on the policy’s formulation has been limited, demonstrating centralised decision making which has clearly been influenced by a strong government standing in parliament. The Labour government held a majority of 66 in 2005, resulting in the ability to table unpopular policies, such as control orders, and still believe in their ability to press them through.

Bibliography

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CASCIANI, Dominic (2011). Q&A: Control orders. [online]. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12108075

GREAT BRITAIN (2000). Terrorism Act 2000. London, The Stationery Office.

GREAT BRITAIN (2001). Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. London, The Stationery Office.

GREAT BRITAIN R.P., Parliament, House of Commons (2005). Research Paper:  O5/14. Prevention of Terrorism Bill. London , The Stationery Office.

GREAT BRITAIN BILL, Parliament, House of Commons (2005). Prevention of Terrorism Bill. London, The Stationery Office. Bill 61 (2004-05)

HEYWOOD, Andrew (2007). Politics. 3rd Edition. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

HUDSON, John and LOWE, Staurt (2009). Understanding the policy process. 2nd Ed. Bristol, The Policy Press.

HUDSON, John, KUHNER, Stefan and LOWE, Stuart (2008). The short guide to social policy. Bristol, The Policy Press

LABOUR, Party (1997). New Labour Manifesto 1997. [online]. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml

LIBERTY (2005). Detention without charge. [online]. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/terrorism/detention-without-charge/index.php

LIBERTY (2010). Liberty’s Briefing on the draft Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (Continuance in force of sections 1 to 9) Order 2010. [online]. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy10/liberty-s-briefing-on-control-order-renewal-2010-house-of-commons.pdf

LINDBLOM, C.E. (1979). ‘Still Muddling Through’. Public Administration Review, 39(6), 517-525.

MARSDEN, Sam (2010). Iraq invasion ‘increased terror activity against UK’. [online]. The Independent, 20 July. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/iraq-invasion-increased-terror-activity-against-uk-2030681.html

METAGORA (Undated). John W. Kingdon. [online]. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.metagora.org/training/encyclopedia/Kingdon.html

RICHARDS, David and SMITH, Martin J. (2002. Governance and public policy in the UK.  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

SIMCOX, Robin (2010). Control Orders: Strengthening National Security. [online]. Centre for Social Cohesion. Last accessed 8 December at: http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1301651552_1.pdf

WAGNER, Adam (2011). Control orders: what are they and why do they matter? [online]. UK Human Rights Blog, 6 January. Last accessed 8 December at: http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/01/06/control-orders-what-are-they-and-why-do-they-matter/

500 words on: Free trade policy- is it for everyone?

Free market capitalism is based upon the premise that private individuals rather than the state make the best economic decisions. By confining the role of the government to protecting private property, maintaining law and order and shielding the system from external exaggeration, this laissez-faire policy of facilitation, rather than regulation; reduces the role of the state to that of the ‘night watchman’, leaving the ‘invisible hand’ of the market to be the controlling force (Marron, 2010).

Just as the free market is facilitated by a reduced state, the free market facilitates free trade. In an international sense the free market economy is accepted as widespread, meaning international trade is a truly globalising factor. Under a free trade policy, prices emerge from supply and demand as one nation’s economy interacts with many others. Twentieth century economist and academic Friedrich van Hayek wrote:

“It is necessary in the first instance that the parties in the market should be free to sell and buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction, and that anybody should be free to produce, sell, and buy anything that may be produced and sold at all”.

(1944,p37)

Furthermore, nineteenth century economist David Ricardo continued the work of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in advocating free trade suggesting that there is mutual benefit as long as nations focus on the areas where they have “relative productivity advantage” (Arnold and McGauley , 2011).  A modern example would be the comparative advantage of Western nations in the field of the finance and service industry and that off South-East Asian nations on production. Essentially, nations should specialise.  With these thoughts in mind, advocates of free trade believe it can ensure maximum prosperity across the globe (Sachs, 2005).

Some critics of free trade policy call in to question Ricardo’s belief in mutually beneficial trading through specialisation, suggesting that such a situation creates little economic mobility. A common example of this is known as the ‘agriculture problem’. As people become wealthier their desire to buy high-spec goods increase, generally produced in well-developed nations. However, as people become wealthier they do not become hungrier, at least not literally, and food production remains the same. Comparably the wealthy nation continues to gain wealth, and the poorer nation remains stagnant (Oxfam, 2011).

Moreover from the idealistic criticism of free trade policy is the realist criticism that free trade does not actually exist. The removal of the state from economic decisions is integral to developing a full and beneficial free market place; critics suggest that in actuality, this does not exist. Through trading agreements countries approve a number of criteria; tariff reductions for example, so as to increase economical interaction and create a trading bloc. This comes at the expense of other nations trading in to that bloc, who become  over-priced through tariff increases to non-trading bloc members, undersold by tariff reduction to trading bloc members and even withdrawn by quotas on nations outside of the trading bloc (Cohen, 2008). Oxfam suggests that through trade diversion, some of the world’s wealthiest nations protect themselves from the free market they preach, the consequences of which for developing nations are dire. (Oxfam, 2011; CHUA, 2004).

When drawing conclusion on whether free trade policy works for all countries, we must consider what in reality free trade is, and what form of international trading we currently undertake. As the originally free market- and consequently developed- economies of the West have introduced trading agreements, they have since become common place, disqualifying many nations from the market. This form of ‘mixed economy’ rather than free market is what leads to the most intense criticism. In it’s current form free trade policy clearly does not work for every nation, this is why discussions on global tariff reduction such as the recent Doha round are of great importance.  Supporters believe that a freer free market and resulting freer free trade can work for all nations.

Bibliography

ARNOLD, Peter and MCGAULEY, Alan (2011). Free Markets and Free Trade. Lecture Slides from SHU Blackboard site International Political Economy 2011-12. Last accessed 28 November at: http://my.shu.ac.uk

CALLINICOS, Alex (2003). An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto. Oxford, Polity Press.

CHUA, Amy (2004). World on Fire. London, Arrow Books.

COHEN, Benjamin (2008). International Political Economy. Oxford, Princeton University Press.

ELLIOTT, Jennifer A. (1994). An Introduction to Sustainable Development. London, Routledge.

HAYEK, Friedrich A. (1944). The Road to Serfdom. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

KINGSBURY, Damien, et al. (eds.) (2008). International Development: Issues and Challenges. Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan.

MARRON, Donald (ed) (2010). 30 Second economics. Lewes, Ivy Press.

OXFAM. Free Trade. (2011). [online]. Last accessed 29 November 2011 at: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/education/resources/milking_it/milkingit/information/the_issues/free_trade.htm

SACHS, Jeffrey (2005). The End of Poverty. London, Penguin Press.

SHAH, Anup. Free Trade and Globalization (2011). [online]. Last accessed 26 November at: http://www.globalissues.org/issue/38/free-trade-and-globalization

STIGILTZ, Joseph (2006). Un autre monde. Contre le fanatisme du marché. Paris, Fayard.

Niccolo Machiavelli: An Explanation.

Niccolo Machiavelli, the Florentine statesman and political thinker, was born in 1469. Yet over five hundred years on, Machiavelli’s name is intrinsically tied to modern political thought, ideology, and analysis; synonymous with amorality, deceit, and cunning. Quentin Skinner describes how Machiavelli has played a prominent role in political life since the fifteenth century, detailing how Shakespeare referred to “The murderous Machiavel”, Edmund Burke described the “odious maxims of Machiavellian policy” and Marx and Engels berated such policies as “paralysing democratic energies” (Skinner, 1981, p1).  

For many years politicians, and active participants in the world in which they operate, countered any links with Machiavelli or his workings. Henry Kissinger, Presidential advisor to Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the 1970’s famously refuted any comparison with Machiavelli, despite the continued association. Other politicians have not shied away from such judgement; Peter Mandelson, a key founder of Britain’s New Labour party appeared to revel in his moniker of ‘Dark Prince’, inspired by Machiavelli’s most famous work.  However, his shady reputation in the upper echelons of government, power-brokering in the shadows of Westminster, earned him few admirers outside his power-circle centred at the top of government.

So with much of the negativity of modern twenty-first century politics neatly tied in a range of terms under one man’s name, Machiavelli seemingly plays the role of perpetrator for man’s governmental sins. But why so? How have the works of Machiavelli resulted in such an infamous legacy, and more importantly, is it an accurate one?

In order to understand Machiavelli, his works, and his legacy, we must first look at the life he led. Born the son of a civil lawyer in fifteenth century Florence, Machiavelli was from modest stock but received a classical education, at the time deemed essential for political men.

The city of Florence in northern Italy had always considered itself a Republic, however for much of the fifteenth century Florence had been an oligarchy dominated by the rule of one banking family, the Medici. The collapse of Medici rule, the reestablishment of the Republic under Savonarola in 1494, and the continuation of this by Soderini in 1498 eventually led to Machiavelli’s introduction to politics (Anglo, 1984).

He was first appointed in to civil service at the age of twenty-nine, fulfilling the role of Chancellor to the Second Chancery with special responsibilities in the fields of militia and foreign affairs. This diplomatic role saw him dispatched across Europe during a period of time in which Sydney Anglo, describes Italy as “hapless” and “playing the battle-ground for European nation-states” (Anglo, 1984, p73). This, Anglo suggests, was a humiliating experience for Machiavelli, but it was also the most rigorous political training he could have undertaken. However, for all his endeavours, Machiavelli’s diplomatic career was circumstantially doomed by his comparatively lowly social status to that of his peers, preventing him from appointment as a full ambassador of the Republic.

Machiavelli’s involvement in military affairs had rather different results. The small town of Pisa had become an increasing embarrassment to the Florentine Republic, as they failed at it’s capture, despite numerous attempts. Soderini thus empowered Machiavelli to create a new militia with a mind to it’s capture. By December 1506 Machiavelli published Discourse on Florentine Military Preperation, calling upon his experience of European embattlement witnessed upon his travels. Within a month a new magistracy was created; the Nine of the Militia, and Machiavelli appointed it’s Chancellor. Eventually, in 1509 Pisa succumbed to Machiavelli’s infantry, and his military career reached optimum status. As such he was entrusted with further military responsibilities on behalf of the Florentine Republic, increasing his influence and power (Anglo, 1984).

However, Machiavelli’s public endearment was short lived. By 1512, the Republic surrendered to a Spanish army supported by Pope Julius II; Soderini fled, Republican institutions were banished and Machiavelli found himself out of work. The Medici once again returned to oligarch status, and the former Chancellor to the Nine of the Militia was wrongly accused of a plot to rid them of their recouped power. Tortured, Machiavelli was eventually released without charge, but remained under suspicion for several years (Skinner, 1981).

Following his trial, Machiavelli retired from public life for fourteen years, a period in which much of his most acclaimed work was created. But in 1526, he again found himself eligible for office and his longing for employment led to election as the Chancellor responsible for the city’s fortifications, albeit it under Medici rule. The small pleasure Machiavelli received from a return to office was short lived; one year after returning to Florentine politics, the Medici administration collapsed. The Republic was re-established and Machiavelli was once again overlooked. One year later, on 21 June 1527, Niccolo Machiavelli died from a long term illness (Niccolo Machiavelli 1469-1527, 2011).

His lifetime in politics had been famous in varied moments, the capture of Pisa most notably, but ultimately Machiavelli can be seen to have been overlooked and at times underestimated in office. It was many years later, when much of the work completed during his enforced retirement from public life was released that he would become most eminent. Through the release of The Prince, The Discourses, The Art of War and The Florentine History, Machiavelli would live on; receiving much greater acknowledgment, both good and bad, posthumously.

The first piece Machiavelli worked on during his exile was to become his most famous. The Prince, although published many years after his death, was written around 1513 and was to be an advisory to the new Medici Prince on how to “gain, hold, and increase political power” (Anglo, 1984, p77). Unlike many of the political thinkers of his era, Machiavelli set out within The Prince to separate political morality from Christian ethics, divorcing practicality from ethics in an early establishment of what we now understand as ‘realpolitik’. Inspired by historical examples such as that of Cesare Borgia, whom he had known personally, Machiavelli detailed how he believed a successful prince should be ruthless, as it is more advantageous to be feared rather than loved, he writes:

“This leads to the debate: Is it better to be loved than feared, or the reverse?  The answer is that it is desirable to be both, but because it is difficult to join them together, it is much safer for a prince to be feared than loved, if he is to fail in one of the two.”

(Knowles, 2004, p502)

Machiavelli goes on to explain how the prince should only keep his word for as long as it is of use to him, and no longer, such acts of ruthlessness can be justified he suggests when he writes:

 “in the actions of men, and especially princes… the end justifies the means”.

(Knowles, 2004, p502)

The themes of cunning and duplicity are perhaps best analysed within The Prince through the explanation of the lion and the fox. Machiavelli describes both animals’ shortcomings: the lion does not protect himself from traps and the fox does not protect himself from wolves. In order for the prince to succeed he must take on the role of both creatures simultaneously: the lion to frighten the wolves, and the fox to recognize the traps (Lukes, 2001).

Machiavelli also discussed Man’s, and indeed the prince’s, power to mould his own destiny.  He referred to two polarities throughout his works which first came to prominence in The Prince, known as fortuna and virtu. These two opposing forces according to Machiavelli determine whether affairs are dominated by chance or whether they can be influenced by human skill or effort. Fortuna, Machiavelli describes as what he believes is manifest in most men’s lives, as they appear nothing more than subject to circumstance. Conversely, virtu he could see in only a few men; the power to control their own paths, and more specifically their political objectives.  In summary he writes “while mankind in general remains subject to the whims of fortuna, it is possible for some men, at least, to control a part of their fate” (Anglo, 1984).

From this brief overview we begin to understand how Machiavelli believed that the virtu of one man alone would be enough to re-establish Florence, and create a strong stable society; however we understand the measures by which Machiavelli would have the prince act, albeit interim, would be violent, and not least cut-throat.

Following The Prince, Machiavelli went to work on The Discourses between 1513 and 1519. The examination of Rome’s political and military institutions was based largely upon Livy’s account of Roman history. Throughout this work Machiavelli once again assessed his views on the nature of man, discussing the deep lying corruption throughout all Italian states and republics.  He goes onto explain that corruption cannot forever be held at bay, not even within the great Roman Empire, as all men have their downfalls. Once again he expels how the fortuna of the many must be overcome by the virtu of “an almost royal hand” (Anglo, 1984, p81). This had already been discussed in principle in The Prince, but in The Discourses Machiavelli goes on to develop his thoughts on the prince’s virtu in to detailed explanations of the importance military expertise, revealing that in order for the prince to triumph his focus must be largely upon battle (Machiavelli, 2003).

The Art of War, written between 1519 and 1520 was Machiavelli’s next focus and the only piece of work published during his lifetime. Following on from the reiterated importance of military expertise in The Discourse, Machiavelli sets out what he believes to be ideal military practice. Although he details exact information on what he believes to be the best forms of recruitment, technique, movement, and organisation, the explicit focus of The Art of War is one of promoting good citizenship through military discipline, reiterating his work in both The Prince and The Discourses that strong laws are controlled by strong arms (Paret, 1986).

Machiavelli’s final work, The Florentine History, written between 1520 and the year of his death 1527, told the story of Florence’s Republic up until 1492. In the broader Italian context Machiavelli details how corruption, explicitly in Florence, had crept into political life as a result of lacking military prowess. This account furthered his initial explanation of corruption stemming from weak militia in The Discourses and provided historical basis for much of the theory already detailed in The Prince and The Art of War.

It has been argued by many that the works of Machiavelli can be difficult to tie down; that the historical basis of one of his theories, can just as easily act as an opponent to another of his concepts.  In The Prince Machiavelli details how the virtu of a prince can be the saviour of the Florentine Republic, and then in both The Discourses and The Art of War he describes the degeneration of the Roman Empire by way of imperial corruption as a result of republican virtu. This has been the cause of criticism for some, but Machiavelli’s intent is clear however contradictory his theories may or may not be; the establishment of a solid republic for the people of Florence was his ultimate goal.

In order to understand whether Niccolo Machiavelli is misrepresented in the twenty-first century we must appreciate not only the content of his work, but the core values and beliefs which he hoped would be extracted from them.

Machiavelli clearly calls upon his views of human nature within his workings. Through the phenomenon of fortuna he explains how he believes most men are not in control of their own destiny, and as such are more inclined to the evils of corruption and fickle behaviour, within The Prince he writes:

“Let no one oppose this belief of mine with that well-worn proverb: ‘He who builds on the people, builds on mud.’”

(Knowles, 2004, p502)

This quotation expresses Machiavelli’s preference for a strong single leader. However, it is also clear that he believes human shortcomings can be remedied.  Sydney Anglo writes:

“It is, he feels, possible both to devise and to teach rules for effective political behaviour, to persuade men to eschew wickedness; to inspire them to selflessness; and to awaken a civic spirit. This is why he writes at all.”

(Anglo, 1984, p78)

These two quotations in tandem exemplify the contrasting nature of Machiavelli’s writing vividly, and yet when placed in context of The Prince we clearly comprehend, if not agree with, his stance on human nature.  He believed that whilst the people of the Florentine Republic were often undesirably stricken to selfish actions, they could be, with the right leadership, a selfless and successful people.

One very apparent reasoning for the longevity of Machiavelli’s presence in political thought since the fifteenth century is clearly the foundation of his works in his opinion of human nature.  Anthony D’Amato writes:

 “Despite the atomic bomb, we have a high degree of sameness of man today with the human model analysed by Machiavelli”

(D’Amato, 1972 ,p210)

Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Tony Blair and author of The Modern Machiavelli agrees:

“If you look back at Machiavelli’s The Prince, the lessons still on the hole apply, even though it is five hundred years later. I think it’s because Machiavelli got to human nature; instead of trying to base things on theology or utopias, he looked at what was real.”

(Today, 2010)

These two explanations of Machiavelli’s relevance go a long way to explaining why we are familiar with his work in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries respectively, but they do not give answer to why the connotations associated with his name exist.

From the analysis of his work, most notably The Prince, we have come to understand that Machiavelli believed only a ruthless leader would return Florence to a stable republic. Through the cunning of the fox and the strength of the lion, he alleged the end would justify the means, as one man’s virtu remedied the fortuna of the many.

With this in mind we must understand the context of Machiavelli’s work. During a blood soaked period of European and indeed Italian history, The Prince was to be seen as a guide to the new Medici ruler on how to establish order in Florence. But, Machiavelli only believed these measures to be temporary; necessary to stabilise the Florentine state and lead to an eventual re-establishment of republican rule (Niccolo Machiavelli 1469-1527, 2003).  

When beginning to draw a conclusion, Niccolo Machiavelli’s most intellectual work; the separation of theology from political practice and leadership, should be seen as the very foundation of much of our modern world and the phenomenon of realpolitik. He can be viewed as one of the first realist political thinkers, and as such should be held in high regard. However, his preference for cunning and deceit, in the form of recommendation to the new prince of Florence in 1513, appears to have overshadowed much of his work, controlling his legacy as an evil, dark figure.

Placing Machiavelli’s political thoughts in context is paramount when analysing the intent of his work; and whilst human nature has changed little over five hundred years, circumstance has. And so, if to be Machiavellian is to believe in the use of immoral behaviour in order to achieve gain, then Niccolo Machiavelli is not so. However, if to believe in the implementation of realpolitik alongside strong leadership and strong law is Machiavellianism, then Machiavelli is as Machiavellian as they come. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century, as in every century following his death, the former appears to supersede the latter.

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500 words on: Europe's connection with the emerging markets.

The financial superpower of Europe has changed drastically since 2007. The recently agreed Greek bailout and the unfolding political pantomime of Berlusconi’s Italy are testament to the continuation of these changes to this day. The established economic regions are not the only ones changing, in 2011 we are very aware of the BRIC economies and to a lesser extent the emerging Next Eleven: Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Through the European Union, ‘Europe’ and it’s 27 member states trade with one another and the world. This collective style of interaction is designed to promote wide-spread European prosperity and protection, and via international organisations such as the G8 and G20, Europe is independently represented on the largest global scale. However, inter-European economic interaction in 2011 is enduring one of the most strained periods since the Second World War as EU member states find themselves engrossed in a battle to save fellow nations, and ultimately, a currency.

Since the financial crisis swept itself across the Atlantic in 2007, European trading has continued to feel the squeeze. The services sector continues to struggle, particular in the epicentre of London, where growth totalled at 0.5% in the last quarter (3^rd qtr. 2011) (BBC, 2011). Manufacturing in Europe has also taken a severe hit in recent years, meaning many of Central and Eastern Europe’s production hotbeds, such as Hungary and Slovakia, have severely slowed, and in the case of some industries stagnated.

The world’s emerging economies find themselves in varying positions in relation to the current state of the European economy. At one end of the scale nations such as Vietnam and Egypt, two of the ‘Next Eleven’ whom rely heavily upon their vast tourism sectors, and have suffered badly as European’s have less expendable cash. (Smithers, 2010). At the other end of the spectrum: China. Europe is China’s largest trading partner and it relies heavily upon European expenditure (EU, 2011).  However, although China’s economy is based largely upon it’s power to manufacture, it is increasingly supported by its services sector, unlike many of the ‘Next Eleven’ and various other manufacturing nations. For these nations, the stagnation of car sales in Europe for example, stunts their own growth as much as it does Europe’s. In this sense we understand the very global role of Europe’s economic power; the non-secondary production of a car in Krakow, not only means the non-sale of a car in Slough, nor does it only mean the non-financing of it’s purchasing from a German bank, but it also means the non-primary production of said car in Indonesia, Turkey or the Philippines (World Bank, 2011).

In order for the all of the emerging economies, large and small, to continue to prosper they clearly need the economic super-powers to continue spending. It is for this reason that many of the more developed growth economies have purchased European debt in recent years and continue to do so today. By propping up the European economy, nation’s such as India and China hope to see a return to economic growth in their own and other emerging regions, with much of Europe’s wealth returned via trade, and of course, interest (Morris, 2011; IBT, 2011). The connection of Europe and the world’s emerging economies is clearly two-way: Europe needs the most well-financed of the emerging economies to fund it through the on-going economic crises and eventually return it to stability. Meanwhile, all of the world’s emerging economies, big and small, need Europe to spend in order to recognise their full potential.

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