Globalisation, Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim.

Globalisation is understood to be the ultimate force shaping our planet today; throughout this essay I shall draw upon the works of two of the great nineteenth and twentieth century sociological theorists respectively; Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim, to see how their descriptions of social change relate to this twenty-first century phenomenon.  

Whether economical, political or cultural, the term ‘globalisation’ refers to the spread of a certain idea or practice between groups around the world, for example trading, manufacturing or purchasing; removing barriers and deregulating communication. By doing so, societies, nations, and eventually continents become integrated through complex networks of interaction (Steger, 2003). 

Both Marx and Durkheim lived and worked before the full extent of globalisation could become reality, indeed this is still the case now, but in today’s world when economic globalisation creates huge flows of capital between nations, when political globalisation means UK law is partly directed from Belgium, and when cultural globalisation means someone in Bombay is just as likely to be an avid fan of The Wire as someone in Baltimore, we live in very different times to which they did. In fact, the term ‘globalisation’ was first used many years after the death of both of these theorists.

Inevitably, some view globalisation as good, some as bad. Some believe it to be the best hope of ending world poverty, others, as we shall see, believe it to be the spread of oppression. However, the merit of globalisation is not the focus of this essay, instead I shall discuss the differing processes from which Marx and Durkheim would suggest it has sprung.

For Karl Marx, social change was a result of social conflict, stating in the Communist Manifesto, alongside co-author Friedrich Engels: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”. Throughout his life, Marx studied how societies changed through the course of history, from early hunter-gatherer societies, to what he described as ‘ancient world societies’, into feudal societies and finally the society we now live in; the capitalist society.  Whilst he observed that social changes often happen gradually, he noted that in some cases very rapid changes occurred (revolutions), and that technological advances were often the reasoning for this. But above all, as Macionis and Plummer state, “he steadfastly held that conflict between economic groups is the major engine for change” (Macionis and Plummer, 2008).

For Marx, capitalism is within itself a system of class conflict, from which all change is stimulated by the economy. Living through the early stages of industrial capitalism, he believed a small part of the population, those that previously fulfilled the feudal roles of merchants and landowners, had become the capitalists, or as he named them, the ‘bourgeoisie’; those that owned the factories and other productive enterprises.  The majority of the rest of the population, those that had previous to the industrial revolution worked on the land, now worked in the factories and other industrial systems and provided the labour necessary for production. Marx named these the ‘proletariat’, the working classes. Like earlier societies, Marx saw capitalism as being made up of two classes. However, differing from previous societies, Marx believed capitalism’s sole aim was profit, and that unlike horticultural and agrarian societies, capitalism was not tied by any codes of honour or obligation. Instead, profit was to be attained at almost any cost, notably the oppression of workers (Macionis and Plummer, 2008).

The initial expansion of capitalism was reliant upon the use of ‘surplus value’, the capital which remains after all costs of production are deducted, otherwise known as profit. Instead of dividing this surplus value equally amongst workers, the capitalists reinvested it, expanding their factories and industries. In order to increase this surplus value, Marx believed that the bourgeoisie would continually cut all productive expenditures, including wages, oppressing the workers as far as possible. This process of seeking to increase profit is where Marx would suggest the expanding nature of capitalism stems from. As well as minimising the costs of production, they also seek to inflate their capital gain by growing into new markets, in new places with new people. This can either be for the benefit of production or sale, but it is overwhelmingly with the aim of increasing profit.

All societies are composed of many social institutions; however, Marx suggested that the institution with the most power and direction to control social change in the capitalist system is the economy. Drawing on the notion of Materialism, Marx suggested that the other major spheres of social life- politics, family, religion, education- function under the direct influence of the economy (Ruben, 1977). Marx therefore described the economy as the ‘base’ and all other institutions as the ‘superstructure’. Simply, the economy, dominated by the capitalists, reinforces their dominance in to all other areas of social life. It is for these reasons that Marx suggested many of the proletariat believed that the bourgeoisie earned their wealth, while those without lacked the ability or knowhow to do so. This is what he named ‘false consciousness’; the belief that social problems are caused by individuals rather than society itself. This false consciousness implemented by the capitalist system of base-superstructure, he believed, obscured the real causes of the working classes struggles.

Finally, as mentioned, Marx believed that social change often relied upon technological advancement and the continued process of modernisation. As we have seen recently,  modern technology such as the internet, and global applications such as Twitter and Facebook, have the ability to organise and start, if not finish, revolutions (The Telegraph, 2009). Indeed he and Engels noted in the Communist Manifesto that without the explosion of science and technology in the nineteenth century the rise of the European bourgeoisie would not have been possible (Steger, 2003).

However, as well as promoting social change, Marx noted that technology also had the ability to act as a barrier to it (Macionis and Plummer 2008).He suggested that as capitalists produced technology to gain power over the world, the technology, and productive processes in which they are involved, would eventually assume power over the proletariat workers, creating a feeling of alienation. Whereas once workers had wholeheartedly interacted with fellow workers, products, and their work itself, Marx commented that technology would withdraw many of these functions and leave workers isolated.

From this very basic introduction to Marx’s views on capitalism, we can see several explanations for the expansion of social change globally. He suggests that capitalism is an expansive force, reaching out and searching for greater profit, in what we now understand to be a global fashion. In this sense Marx would suggest that all forms of globalisation are for the purpose of capital gain only. So as well as the obvious aims of economical expansion, cultural globalisation such as that of film and media, are also solely to create profit. Marx also suggests that the capitalist system, and the expansion of it, is innately protected by the false consciousness of the working classes, implemented by the base-superstructure and the control of the economy by the bourgeoisie.

Writing in the Communist Manifesto on the discovery of America, and the early expansion of European capitalism, he and Engels state:

The discovery of America prepared the way for mighty industry and its creation of a truly global market...The growth of industry, trade, navigation and railroads also went hand in hand with the rise of the bourgeoisie and capital which pushed to the background the old social classes of the Middle Ages…. Chased around the globe by its burning desire for ever-expanding markets for its products, the bourgeoisie has no choice but settle everywhere… Rapidly improving the instruments of production, the bourgeoisie utilizes the incessantly easing modes of communication to pull all nations into civilization- even the most barbarian ones… In a nutshell, it creates the world in its own image.” (Steger, 2003, p32).

From this description, thirty-six years before his death, we see that Marx had a very clear grasp on what we now describe as ‘globalisation’ and the important role of technology within it. By stating that capitalism ‘creates the world in its own image’, he and Engels not only refer to trading systems, but the whole base-superstructure which must be in place for capitalism to work in full effect; creating laws and privatising production in order for the bourgeoisie to influence all aspects of social life.

However, Marx deemed such expansion to be one of the final stages of capitalism, and in turn one of the final stages of the conflict model of social change. He believed that the capitalist system would implode as the continued search for profit lead to irreversible centralisation, economic depressions, overproduction and unemployment. In turn, he believed that eventually the proletariat would awaken from their false consciousness and that it would be replaced with ‘class consciousness’ as they responded and eventually revolted against the oppression and alienation they had been subjected too, bringing to an end the capitalist system and replacing it with a socialist and eventual communist state. Ultimately he believed capitalism, and in turn globalisation, were doomed to failure.

Although like Marx, Emile Durkheim believed in macro-sociology and the change of society as a whole, for him, social change was the product of evolution rather than conflict. Witnessing the rapid transformation of Europe throughout the nineteenth century, Durkheim noted and discussed the changes from what he named ‘mechanical solidarity’ to ‘organic solidarity’.

Prior to the industrial revolution, Durkheim believed societies to be tied together by mechanical solidarity, a likeness of traditions and bonds based upon shared morality. He called these common beliefs the ‘collective conscience’ and noted that social institutions such as religion played an imperative role in forming this phenomenon.  When discussing the views expressed by Durkheim in ‘Causes of Anomie and the Role Played by the Economy’ on religion in pre-industrial society, Ken Morrison remarks that religion not only enforces the collective conscience but also gives reasoning to citizens roles in society, placing life in perspective and teaching them that economic success is not the primary goal of life, further than this, religion compensates societies hardships by promising compensation in the next life (1995, p185).

It is from these simple societies, based in mechanical solidarity, that Durkheim believed holistic change occurred in evolutionary fashion, producing the complex global societies we live in today. He suggests that population growth plays an important role in social change, but above all else he notes society’s ‘division of labour’, the specialisation of work and economic activity, as the key process in the change from simple to complex societies.

The organic solidarity that Durkheim believed sprung from the developing division of labour was specifically due to the increasing specialisation of the work force following the industrial revolution, creating interdependency on a scale never before seen.  Morrison continues;

“As production, income and the division of labor began to develop more freely, the social threshold set by earlier periods became redirected. As a result, needs and wants- and even entire perspectives- are raised to a ‘fever-pitch’. The replacement of religion by economy subordinated society to economic and industrial ends. The intense economic focus of society freed desires from previous moral limits and replaced moral restraints with utilitarian sanctions inherent in law and social rules. Eventually , the extension and activity of markets acted to extend and expand desire.”   (Morrison, 1995, p186)

Here we see an explanation of how the changes implicated by the industrial revolution, not only changed the types of roles fulfilled by workers, but the type of desires that these new jobs and markets created. However, Durkheim warned that, the expanding nature of the new complex society, as well as widening the ambitions of workers, had the potential to be catastrophic. He suggested that when the economy replaces other social institutions, such as religion, in importance, the risk for social and moral insubordination is highly increased.

During his study of Suicide, and the phenomenon of ‘Anomie’, a lack of social norms created by rapid social change, Durkheim suggested that anomie related to the economy was one of the largest causes of suicide (Giddens, 2009). However, as the shift from simple to complex society occurs, Durkheim suggested that the mechanical features of likeness are replaced with the organic differentiation meaning social and industrial bonds now unite workers through difference rather than likeness.

Globalisation then for Durkheim, is based not solely upon the economy, but the global spread of the complex society. As such, he believed that as members of modern societies, eventually rather than being reliant on a few thousand people after the initial spread of specialisation, we would one day rely on millions of citizens interlinking, communicating and living in a truly global sense, all in order to secure the resources and services to live everyday life. He believed that as such, the societies partaking would become truly classless and wholly meritocratic. As we have seen, he warned that the advantages of modern freedom create a dilemma in which moral guidance is lacking, however, he believed that with the spread of the complex society and organic solidarity, a new form of moral unity, or ‘world patriotism’, would be sprung, recreating, in sorts, the moral guidance of the simple society and tackling the issues of anomie.

Comparatively, both theorists approach social change very differently, leaving comparisons few and far between. However, the main conflict between Marx and Durkheim would be that of false consciousness versus tradition and morality. The moral guidance discussed by Durkheim in the simple society, and the potential for it in the complex society through world patriotism is undermined by Marx, who suggests that any such institutions, providing guidance, are at the disposal of the capitalists. As we have seen, predictions for the future of society are also converse; however it is fair to say that Durkheim’s belief of growing interdependence is increasingly true in a very global sense. His hopes for the disposal of the class system have been slower in progress, but the growth of meritocracy has been faster paced, largely due to the barriers of the simple society, and the acceptance of them, being removed, at least in part by what he would describe as world patriotism. Marx’s hopes for the downfall of the capitalist system haven’t yet materialised, advanced economic systems have meant although crashes have occurred, recoveries have been much less catastrophic than Marx predicted. Finally, the hunger for social change by the working classes has lessened not only through their increasing wealth in the most modern capitalist societies, but also through the downfall of many high profile socialist and communist societies.

Bibliography

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EMIRBAYER, Mustafa (2003). Emile Durkheim, Sociologist of Modernity. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.

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MACIONIS, John J. and PLUMMER, Ken (2008). Sociology, 4th Edition. London, Pearson Education.

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MORRISON, Ken (1995). Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought. London, Sage Publications.

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STEGER, Manfred B. (2003). Globalization, A very short introduction. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

The language of Human Rights, or the prose of Racism? A Critical Hermeneutic Report on the English Defence League Website.

Abstract

This report is based upon the English Defence League, and the critical hermeneutic analysis of their website; www.englishdefenceleague.org. Drawing from the debate on Islam in ‘Western’ society and more specifically in Britain, including academic works, newspaper and political literature, it argues that the issue of ‘Islamaphobia’ is an increasing one. It suggests that the website in question has racist undertones and that many of its statements, are intentionally misleading. The report concludes that through misuse of language, purposeful implication of semantic themes and use of images, the website seeks to create a feeling of both fear and hatred.

Literature Review

Since the catastrophic events of the nine/eleven disaster, attitudes towards the Muslim community across the world have become, in certain sections of society, increasingly strained.  Certain groups such as the English Defence League, have been founded on the basis of this, and can be seen as a reaction to the increasing fear, hatred and misunderstanding of Islam.

During an academic survey in 2002, researchers from the University of Leicester found that racist attacks and abuse took a steep incline in the Leicestershire area during the immediate aftermath of the New York Terror attacks. Research Director, Dr Lorraine Sheridan told the BBC that “The attacks are being carried out by people who don’t like Islam, the abuse is more about the religion than the race” continuing to remark that “The people behind the attacks think that Muslims are outside of society and that they are different”. Conclusions on the research also noted that the trend was increasingly worrying as Leicester had been said as a leading model of multiculturalism and integration for Britain (BBC NEWS, 2002).

Four years after the American Attacks, on the 7^th July 2005, the rise of ‘Islamaphobia’ in Britain was again dramatically increased following the bombing of the London transport system by four young British Muslims, said to be linked to Al Qaeda. Once again, the attacks provoked angry responses from certain sections of society, The Independent reporting acts of arson and criminal damage against mosques in London, Bristol, Leeds, Telford and Birkenhead in the aftermath (Verkaik, 2005). Days after the attack, the British National Party distributed a by-election leaflet with the image of the devastated No.30 bus underlined by the slogan “Maybe now it’s time to start listening to the BNP”. 

Rapid social change, such as the discussed terror attacks provided, inevitably reminds us of Durkheim’s theory of Anomie, a sense of confusion over social norms and values stimulated by periods of fast-paced societal alteration. Five years prior to the London attacks, Islam played a much less prominent role in the lives of the majority of ‘Western’ society, however following them, Britain had seen two serious  attacks, one on their closest ally, the other on its capital, and a war on terror in which many Briton’s continue to lose their lives. The aforementioned actions of both members of society and certain political groups in response to this social change could therefore be seen as part of the anomic process (Macionis and Plummer, 2008).

In his 2008 work, ‘Thought paralysis: tolerance, and the fear of Islam’, Farhad Dalal suggested that fear of Islamic jihadists in Britain is still increasing, he believes primarily through a lack of understanding. Although there are many millions of Muslims living in Britain, he suggests that they remain largely isolated in society, and as such, the mystery surrounding them can lead to “all kinds of projections and fantasies” (Dalal, 2008, p90).

In February 2011, Prime Minister, David Cameron, stated that “We [Britain] have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream”. His speech gathered plaudits for its encouragement of interaction, but worried many, including large sections of the Muslim community for his promise to end multiculturalism in Britain, stating that those who failed to promote ‘British’ values will no longer be able to engage with the state (Kirkup, 2011).

Methodology

As this report is based upon the critical hermeneutic analysis of the chosen website, it is important to first understand what the critical hermeneutic approach is and what it entails.

Hermeneutics, in the simplest form, is textual interpretation, and it is closely related to Max Weber’s notion of interpretation; ‘Verstehen’.  As well as exploring sociocultural and historic influences on text, this approach to qualitative interpretation attempts to look beneath the surface and discover hidden meanings, influences and agendas. The critical aspect takes into account the context of which the text was both produced and is read, looking at the referent itself as well as the denotative and connotative meanings it produces (Bryman, 2008).

Linked to the critical social theory, aiming to identify contradictions within society, critical hermeneutics can be seen to challenge accepted normality and expose hidden power imbalances. German sociological philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer suggested that critical hermeneutics helps us to understand our prejudices through text, as our life long socialisation becomes not only embedded in our writing of texts, but our reading of them also. Each of us have different up-bringings, backgrounds and histories, therefore how we interpret text will also differ (Gadamer, 1960). It is for this reason that criticism of hermeneutics, and critical hermeneutics, suggests that any findings cannot be generally applied to texts, similar to criticisms of qualitative research more generally. However, a thorough piece of work, clearly presented and high in detail as well as explanation can offer a very insightful view of not only a text, but the issue it is concerned with.

With this in mind it is important to note that all text is produced in the context of its publication and interpreted at the time of reading. Therefore in this report it is important to take into account when the website was produced and under what societal circumstances, in order to understand the context in which it was created. As well as this, the time in which it is interpreted must be taken into account and what has changed since?

Having chosen the English Defence League’s website, I have decided to research a highly sensitive issue in Britain today, that of Islamaphobia.  In 2010, the PEW Research Centre, revealed that five per cent of Britain’s population are now Muslim (National Secular Society, 2011). Many groups such as the English Defence League fear the influence of Islam on British, European and Western society, and are said to be more specifically opposed to what they believe are increasing numbers of fundamentalist Muslims or jihadists.

The analysis of a website on such a sensitive issue will allow me to look at in detail the prose of a group who claim to be a human rights organisation concerned with the protection of their nation. By analysing and interpreting their website I hope to discover whether the English Defence League are as they say concerned with issues of human rights and the protection of all races, or whether they are in fact a racist anti-Islamic organisation?

Results

www.englishdefenceleague.org, is the official homepage of the English Defence League and is ran by the group itself. The website contains original materials, such as articles, speeches, images and videos uploaded exclusively to the site by the EDL, as well as including external sources from approved bodies and personnel, such as writers and supporters of the group.

The website is only available in English, which may be seen to exclude certain aspects of society, particularly those that the group are opposed to. Largely, the website is written in an informal tone, meaning that it is easy to read.

None of the pages within the site contain, relate or link to any of the negative press the group has had in the media and as such the site’s addressers are those trusted by the EDL to represent their organisation. The use of ‘journalistic articles’ aim to give credibility to the group and their site; however it is worthy of note that the ‘writers’ are likely to be members of the EDL or its affiliated groups. The addressees of the site are people looking for general information on the group, such as the general public, and they are also the members of the EDL seeking the specific information discussed below.

As discussed in the Literature Review, the attitude towards Muslims and Islam in Britain is a serious and popular area for discussion, with many different viewpoints. The referential function then of the website is to provide a place for the output of information regarding the EDL and their stance on the aforementioned debate. This information includes broad aspects such as the group’s political views, and also features specific information such as news, the organisation of events, reaction to phenomena and advertisements.  These key features are also the purpose of the website for its producer.

The key message throughout the site is one of warning against fundamental Islamism and its impact on Britain. A theme also prominent throughout is one of division, us versus them. The three specific pages which this report looked at: The Home Page, The Mission Statement and Testimonials, are often divisive, contradictory and threatening.

At the opening of the Mission Statement, the EDL accuse “certain sections of the Muslim population in Britain” of committing crimes including “molestation of young children”, “homophobia”, “anti-Semitism” and “support[ing] those responsible for terrorist atrocities” this is in reference to what they later describe as “fundamentalists”, “radicals” and “jihadists”.  However, shortly below they commit to “protect against the unjust assumption that all Muslims are complicit in or somehow responsible for these crimes”.  The latter statement can be seen as an attempt to protect the former.

However, as the text continues it is clear to see a theme of contradiction as references to Islam in general are used negatively, rather than the ‘certain sections’ mentioned earlier in the text. For example:

“The public must be provided with a more realistic and less sanitised view of Islam”

“We also recognise that Muslims themselves are frequently the main victims of some Islamic traditions and practices.”

“...the often unreasonable demand that Islam is given more respect than it is due…”

The indexical “we” is also used throughout the website, and particularly in the Mission Statement to refer to the EDL as a group, rather than just the writers of the text. These also feature to create an addresser-addressee relationship when read, as EDL members relate to “we” as them.

The following words are also used in reference to not only the ‘certain sections of the Muslim population in Britain’, but British Muslims in general. Some of the words used can have multifaceted denotations, but in this instance they are negative, and as such act as connotations:

o   Thriving

o   Encroachment

o   Threat

o   Resentment

o   Unwittingly

o   Forced

o   Undermine

As well as text, the site also makes use of images, some examples of which are below:

These two images, featuring hooded, masked, violent looking men portray connotations of conflict and unlawfulness.

The images have clearly been used to intimidate any opposition to the group through fear of confrontation.

The nationalistic tone continues from the name of the group into the use of the St George’s Cross.

It is clear to see that the use of “signs” within the website have led to an interpretation of the text’s code as being multifaceted and with many underlying meanings and suggestions. The seemingly purposeful misuse of ambiguous terms such as “fundamentalists”, “radicals” and “jihadists” alongside terms such as “Islam” and “Muslims” is the prime example.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a number of underlying connotations appear to run through the text of the English Defence League’s website. The use of divisive language has been discussed and links directly to the work of Farhad Dalal discussed in the Literature Review. Dalal suggests that large parts of the Muslim society in Britain remain isolated, and as such, the mystery surrounding them can lead to largely unsupported fallacies, such as the accusations of molestation, homophobia, anti-Semitism and support for fundamentalism discussed in the Results section (Dalal, 2008).

The addresser of the text is also worth taking in to conclusion, as unlike many political forums for debate, no opposition to the group’s activities are allowed to contribute to the site. This means the content of the site is unchallenged and from one perspective only.

The use of images and semantics have played a key role in the analysis of this website, and an underlying theme of negativity and fear have been prolific throughout. The two images displayed exemplify the tone of the site’s prose.

The misuse of religious and sectarian terms creates for a confusing muddle of language, leading to what in part is the undeniable subjugation of the Islamic faith rather than the “certain sections of the Muslim population in Britain”.

This purposeful use of language creates a text in which, unless the reader has an understanding of the matter in hand, and the issues, groups and societies surrounding it, could easily be lead to believe that “Muslims”, “Islamists”, “Fundamentalists”, “Radicals” and “jihadists” are one and the same.

Finally, it is important to note that as Gadamer tells us, interpretation of text is subject to our own socialisation, and in turn; prejudices (Gadamer, 1960). With this in mind, we understand that the text is open to interpretation, and that the conclusions drawn are that solely of the author.

Bibliography

BBC NEWS (2002). UK ‘Islamapobia’ rises after 11^th September [online]. Last accessed 12 April 2011 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2223301.stm

BRYMAN, Alan (2008). Social Research Methods, Third Edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CHANDLER, Daniel (2003). Semiotics for beginners [online]. Last accessed 10 April 2011 at: http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/

ENGLISH DEFENCE LEAGUE (2010). The English Defence League [online]. Last accessed 12 April 2011 at:  www.englishdefenceleague.org.

FARHAD, Dalal (2008) Thought paralysis: tolerance, and the fear of Islam. Psychodynamic Practice, 14(1), 77-95

GADAMER, Hans-Georg (1960). Truth and Method. London, Sheed and Ward.

KIRKUP, James (2011) Muslims must embrace British values, David Cameron says [online]. Last accessed 31 March 2011 at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/8305346/Muslims-must-embrace-our-British-values-David-Cameron-says.html

MACIONIS, John J. and PLUMMER, Ken (2008). Sociology, 4th Edition. London, Pearson Education.

NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY (2011). How many Muslims are there in Britain? [online]. Last accessed 1 April 2011 at: http://www.secularism.org.uk/how-many-muslims-are-there-in-br.html

VERKAIK, Robert (2005) Muslims call for calm after mosque attacks [online]. Last accessed 30 March 2011 at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/muslims-call-for-calm-after-mosque-attacks-498508.html)

Social Disorganisation Theory, Strain Theory, and Culture Deviance Theory: Placing crime in it's social context.

Crime is committed every day throughout the world, varying from low level delinquencies to high level offences.  It is highly likely that at some point in our lives we will be involved in a crime, whether as the victim, or the assailant. In 2009, for every 1000 people in the city of London, 109 were involved in some form of criminally related incident (Office for National Statistics, 2010). But why do people commit crime? ‘Social Disorganisation theory’, ‘Strain theory’, and ‘Cultural Deviance theory’, are an example of criminology’s attempts to answer such questions and place crime in its social context.  

Criminologist, Robert K. Merton, radically adapted the functionalist understanding of crime in the 20^th century through his ‘Strain theory’, developing on the notion of ‘Anomie’, originally established by sociologist Emile Durkheim. Unlike Durkheim, Merton believed the issues surrounding crime, those which created anomie (a sense of confusion over social norms and values), to be more associated with the strains of unequal opportunities, than the strains of sudden social change. Suggesting the key issues surrounding crime and society were that of meritocracy, with the gap between “a truly meritocratic society” and the reality of “one’s birth position within the social structure” the determining feature (Hale, 2005, p70).

His seminal work on deviance in 1938, presented the argument that while crime is inevitable in all societies; excessive levels of delinquency are a result of certain social arrangements (Macionis and Plummer, 2008). Writing originally on 1930s America, Merton argued that many people are denied the chance of achieving “legitimate goals”, i.e. monetary success, as they are denied access to certain institutions or “legitimate channels”, such as a schooling or job opportunities (Agnew, 2003). This notion can easily be applied to lower-class citizens, but can also be applied to higher-class citizens who are not attaining their financial goals.

Merton suggested that conformity in the United States was to be found through aspiring to legitimate goals, related to the US ideal of pursuing the American Dream. However, not everyone who strives for conventional success has the means to attain it, thus, turning to crime to do so. The only difference between criminals and non-criminals then Merton suggested, was their routes towards such success (Macionis and Plummer, 2008). This was seen as a pivotal moment for 20^th century criminology, as it “blurred the positivist boundary between “them” (the criminal) and “us” (the non-criminal)”. Following 1938; “no longer was the criminal essentially different from the good citizen” (Hale, 2005, p70).  

Merton believed that society was divided into five groups, who leave by the concepts of; conformism, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion.  A child raised in poverty, who sees no way of achieving culturally approved goals (money) via conventional means (employed work), may take to selling drugs to attain his/her desired wealth.  Merton believed that the emphasis on acquisition of wealth in 20^th century America, and the limited opportunities to get rich, especially for those in poverty, gave rise to “theft, the selling of illegal drugs or other forms of street hustling” (Macionis and Plummer, 2008, p562). American rap star Christopher Wallace, a.k.a. Biggie Smalls, can be used as a modern example of having committed crimes of innovation.  Having been brought up on the tough streets of 1980s Brooklyn, New York, by a single mother, Wallace dropped out of High School. In order to attain the fame and fortune at the heart of the American dream, he turned to the unconventional means of dealing drugs as he had little education or job opportunities. Eventually, Wallace would attain culturally accepted goals by culturally accepted means, but his first footsteps along the way were criminal ones.

“Ritualism”, Merton’s second form of delinquency suggests that “ritualists resolve the strain of limited success by abandoning cultural goals in favour of almost compulsive efforts to live respectably” (Macionis and Plummer, 2008, p562). Essentially this group do not reject the goals of society, but reject the possibility of achieving them, meaning that they are unlikely to commit crime in an attempt to reach such goals.

Merton described the rejection of both cultural means and goals as “retreatism”. This group can be most easily related to members of society that seem to “drop out”, such as addicts and the homeless. Whereas retreatists are understood to accept the situation they find themselves in, “Rebels” reject society and seek to advocate another way to the existing social order. This form of rejecting cultural means and goals is often related to countercultures, and their criminal activities (Macionis and Plummer, 2008).

Following Merton’s original work, many criminologists have continued to study his theory with Downes and Rock (1988, p94) describing it as the “fostering of the propensity to consume irrespective of the material possibilities of such a course”. However, the most influential continuation of Merton’s work has been the notion of “status frustration”, introduced by Albert Cohen. It has come to play an important role in the wider understanding of the subject, and was first introduced by Cohen in 1955. In his study, Delinquent Boys, Cohen suggests that some individuals may be frustrated by a more general desire for status, not only money. More than money, status involves how people are viewed and treated by others. For lower-class citizens, middle-class status can be a lot harder to attain through legitimate means, than money itself (Agnew, 2003). Agnew goes on to suggest that:

“Some lower-class individuals … respond to their status frustration by setting up an alternative status system in which they can successfully compete.” (2003, p417-18)

This would clearly relate to the “Rebel” group previously described by Merton. Street gangs, in particular those involved in violent and drug crimes, can be seen to live in a status system by which a gang leader with a lengthy criminal record, is someone to be admired and respected; a status system which to the conformist would be seen as highly unconventional.

Merton’s theory has clearly been an influential one; most interestingly it tackles the issues of motivation, and gives us an idea of how strain can create frustration and in turn crime. It gives us an insight into why crime levels are generally higher in poorer areas and why when legitimate means of achieving goals are restricted, delinquency also appears to rise. As well as to areas, this can also be applied to periods of time such as those of economic depression (Hale, 2005).

However, as his work was focused on the United States, and more generally the Western capitalist world, Strain theory can only be related to such societies. A final criticism is that, Merton’s work fails to tackle the issue of white-collar crime and why those who have the means to achieve their goals still commit crime (Lotz, 2005).

The second theory in question, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay’s ‘Social Disorganisation theory’ can in some ways be related to Merton’s work on strain, not least because both theories evolved from the ‘Chicago School of Sociology’, famous for the relationships established by its scholars between crime and the environment (Hale, 2005). Shaw and McKay’s theory, first released in 1942, argued that crime rates were determined by the area, involving factors such as economic, spatial and environmental circumstances They argued that, the closer to the city centre, the higher the levels of “truancy, delinquency and adult crime”, and that this was due to the “physical make-up of different communities”. Most interestingly that this remained the case even following periods of extensive population change (Muncie, 2003, p411).

Using the ‘Concentric Zone Model’ already established by Chicago School sociologists, Robert Park and Ernest Jones, Shaw and McKay investigated the five different areas defined in the model. In centrality outwards: the Central Business District, Transitional Zone, Working Class Zone, Residential Zone, and Commuter Zone. They discovered that the zones of transition, situated almost at the heart of Chicago, were characteristically: ran-down, high in poverty and poor in levels of health. Ultimately, these were the most disorganised districts. These areas were often the first homes for immigrants and groups that would only stay for as long as until they were able to move to a more affluent area. As such this ‘Transitional Zone’ was an area of constant change, making it difficult for relationships to be established within the community, meaning that “informal levels of social control” were particularly low, and crime levels high (Hale, 2005). Shaw and McKay said themselves that this was not necessarily due to the personalities of the population of this environment but that “delinquency rates were for these groups high...because of other aspects of the total situation in which they lived” (Shaw and McKay, 1942, pg56). As their investigations led to conclusions on delinquency within the four other zones of the Concentric Model, Shaw and McKay discovered that “delinquency rates… declined the further one moved into the prosperous suburbs” (Hayward, 2001, p31).

In conclusion to their studies, Shaw and McKay believed that deviance was more related to the environment than the personality or social stature of criminals, relating to the basic idea of ‘nature’ rather ‘nurture’, and that criminal behaviour was to be expected as a response to living in such “abnormal environmental circumstances” (Treadwell, 2006, p46).

Whereas Merton believed giving someone the right chances, determined by wealth of opportunity, would result in them becoming a non-criminal conformist. Shaw and Mckay believed that housing someone in an organised, and essentially wealthy area, would ultimately result the same way.

However, naturally, criticisms exist. Lotz (2005) criticises Shaw and McKay’s theory for not accounting for crimes committed in areas not considered disorganised. Similar to Strain theory also, it fails to tackle the issue of middle-class and white-collar crime. Finally, Lotz suggests that it offers no explanation for how deviant norms and values are transmitted.

However, the final theory in question, that of ‘Cultural Deviance’, explores the very essence of Lotzs’ final criticism. Developed by Edwin Sutherland, another scholar of the Chicago School, his theory explores the notion that criminal activity is a result of a learned experience. Suggesting that through interaction, individuals absorb the necessary views, beliefs, techniques and motivations to commit crime.

Sutherland suggests that a child brought up within a wealthy criminal family, is more likely to go on to be a criminal, than use the opportunities afforded to them by the family’s wealth to live an honest, non-criminal lifestyle.  This could be applied to the infamous crime families of Italy, not least the Sicilian Mafia, who instil not only knowhow to future generations, but also a sense of heritage and pride within the families honour and tradition.

However, as part of his ‘Differential Association theory’, Sutherland developed the notion of Cultural Deviance more closely with the lower-class subcultures, existing  in the financially poor, socially disorganised areas of Chicago, previously described as ‘zones of transition’. These districts, filled with communities that have their own set of goals and values, much like the wealthier subculture of the Italian crime families discussed, also pass these on to future generations (Hollin, 2003).  

Rooted in the ‘conflict perspective’, Sutherland approved of the notion that crime is a normal condition of society (Matsueda, 1997), and that ‘nurture’, rather than ‘nature’ is the determining factor in whether or not an individual is likely to be delinquent.

Once again, this theory ties in with discussions surrounding various other ideas. The Social Disorganisation theory could perhaps be understood to develop a subculture of criminal activity amongst communities, only for the Cultural Deviance theory, to take over as the views and opinions of previous generations are passed on through families and communities.

Similarly to the other theories discussed, Sutherland’s work has been the subject of criticism, most notably the lack of explanation for how an individual can become criminal if they are not from a criminal background, family, or subculture (Matsueda, 1997).

In conclusion, each of the theories discussed believe that society plays a paramount role in the development of criminal activity. Each theory has developed a different understanding of how delinquency manifests itself in the lives of individuals, families, subcultures and communities. With the issue of ‘Nature v Nurture’ being a prominent one.

However, each theory has had individual criticisms, most notably throughout the seeming inability to be able to tackle the issue of white-collar delinquencies. Collectively, they also come under scrutiny as the products of the same city in similar timeframes. In the early 20^th century, Chicago was a quickly expanding industrial city, meaning that these theories, while they are useful in the direct analysis of similar Western cities and nations, they are not so useful elsewhere.

In some ways it is clear to see how the boundaries between these theories can become blurred, and it is then that we best begin to understand the roles in which these theories have helped us begin to place crime in its social context, for example, the discussed relationship between Social Disorganisation leading to a process of Cultural Deviance.

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ANTHONY, Thalia and CUNNEEN, Chris (eds.) (2008) The Critical Criminology Companion. Sydney, Hawkins Press.

COHEN, Albert (1955). Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York, Free Press.

DOWNES, D. and ROCK, P. (1988). Understanding Deviance. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

HALE, Chris, et al. (eds.) (2005). Criminology. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

HAYWARD, K (2001). Chicago School of Sociology. In: McLAUGHLIN, Eugene and MUNCIE, John. The Sage Dictionary of Criminology. London, Sage.

HOBBS, Dick (1995). Bad Business. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

HOLLIN, Clive (2003). Differential Association. In: In: McLAUGHLIN, Eugene and MUNCIE, John. The Sage Dictionary of Criminology, Second Edition. London, Sage.

LOTZ, R. (2005). Youth crime: A modern synthesis in America. New Jersey, Pearson Education.

MACIONIS, John J. and PLUMMER, Ken (2008). Sociology, 4^th Edition. London, Pearson Education.

MATSUEDA, Ross L. (1997). Cultural Deviance Theory: The Remarkable Persistence of a Flawed Term. Theoretical Criminology, 1(4), 429-52.

MATZA, David (1964). Delinquency and Drift. London, John Wiley and Sons.

MUNCIE, John (2003). Sociological Positivism. In: McLAUGHLIN, Eugene and MUNCIE, John. The Sage Dictionary of Criminology, Second Edition. London, Sage.

O’BRIEN, Martin and YAR, Majid (2008). Criminology, The Key Concepts. London, Routledge. OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS (2010). Regional Trends: London: Social Indicators. [online]. Last accessed 16 January 2011 at: http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=437

SHAW, C.R. & H.D. McKAY (1942). Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

TREADWELL, James (2006). Sage Course Companion: Criminology. London, Sage.

An essay on the relationship between 'Class' and 'Employment' in Modern Britain.

Part One of this essays details the relationship in practice between Class and Employment in Britain since 1970:

Since 1970, both employment and the social class system have changed greatly in the United Kingdom, but the firm relationship between the two has continued (Crompton 2010). Deindustrialisation has led to wholesale decreases in manufacturing and the opening of new markets. The class debate has continued, with the ‘Registrar General’s” method of grouping classes being replaced with the modern “NS-SEC Scheme” in response to changes in society, notably the type of jobs British citizens fulfil.  

The decline of British industry, notably following the election of the Conservative government in 1979 had both immediate and lasting effects. Stephen Moore (1993, p51) suggests the changes made between 1978 &1993 in the British economy:

 “seem likely to maintain a permanently high level of unemployment.  The main changes include increasing automation in industry and related increasing productivity so that fewer workers are required, and the general decline of British manufacturing because of foreign competition.”

Moore goes on to suggest particular groups in society are more likely to suffer unemployment than others; the least skilled, those living away from the south-east & ethnic minority groups. Here, inequality is evident. Using the “Registrar General’s Social Class Scheme” in use at the time, we understand that then, as now, unskilled workers are considered to be working class. Moore explains that ethnic minorities are too more likely to suffer unemployment, as a large majority fill the unskilled or semiskilled worker category. Finally, those living away from the south east. This raises the issue of the north-south divide in the UK, on which Moore suggests the south east offers a more highly skilled work force than the north and a more affluent population. Again, discriminating against low-skilled, modestly paid, working class citizens.

Cuts to working class industrial jobs, saw high levels of not only unemployment, peaking at 13.1% in 1986, but high levels of social unrest, such as the miners strikes between 1984 & 1985 (Trading Economics, 2010). Such activities were seen as a response to the structural unemployment of millions of people being implemented by the government. Structural unemployment by nature reduces jobs in response to changes in the economy which should simultaneously open new positions for skilled workers. In this case, in order to enter an open market and tackle inflation, a policy of monetarism was introduced, with the belief that high levels of unemployment would eventually solve themselves as Britain moved into a new market. A change described by David J. Lee & Bryan S. Turner (1996, p184) as “the switch from manufacturing to services”.

In October 1986, the newly reformed British Stock Exchange reopened with national unemployment at a post-industrial high. The “big bang” that ensued managed to tackle much of Britain’s deficit with only 330,000 people working in City jobs (Marr, 2007). Meanwhile, those made redundant by the deindustrialisation and privatisation of Britain seemingly remained unemployed, struggling to find jobs in the new economy, particularly in areas with strong histories of manufacturing and production. The workers filling Classes 1 & 2 of the NS-SEC scheme were not only generating the majority of wealth in the nation, but wreaking most of the reward.

In an article for The Journal, William Green (2009) describes how the Conservative government, and in particular the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, left “communities devastated, mass unemployment, huge social unrest and a generation condemned to poverty”. The “generation” mentioned were not those in professional roles benefiting from the new “boom”, but the working classes. Phil Wilson MP says “she [Thatcher] left a lot of broken communities and that was the primary thing, but it was also the way she treated people who were unemployed…. there was nothing done to help them”. However, in contrast Peter Atkinson MP suggests that “Sensible and dispassionate people will realise there was no prospect of keeping coal mines or inefficient industries going” and that without such policies, regeneration would never have happened.

Eventually, as the initial reforms in the British financial and business sector began to grow, increasing numbers of jobs were created and a large number of the working classes went back to work, but even at the peak of the economic boom in 1989, 1.6 million remained unemployed. And on 16^th September 1992, Black Wednesday, Britain’s next “bust” occurred. Between the low of 1989 and Black Wednesday, unemployment had again risen and was around 3 million, continuing to rise into the following year (Trading Economics, 2010).

The cycle of boom and bust then began again. Unemployment dropped sharply through the mid to late nineties and continued to do so into the 21^st century, meanwhile Gross Domestic Productivity grew and Britain appeared richer than ever under a new-New Labour government. But once again the bubble burst, this time in 2007. A worldwide financial crisis rooted in over-lending and deregulated banks, resulting in the biggest recession in Britain for nearly 30 years. Similarly to the manufacturing decline of the 1980’s this resulted in huge levels of blue-collar unemployment, although this time it wasn’t being purposefully implemented by the government. Further comparisons can also be drawn; the unemployment rate amongst those filling “elementary occupations” was at 12% in the first quarter of 2009, whilst unemployment amongst “managers and senior officials” was at 3% during the same period. In sum, for every four elementary employees out of work, there was one manager or senior official: a display of inequality in class and unemployment, similar to 30 years previous (Hopkins, 2009).  

In beginning to conclude the debate on the relationship between class and employment inequalities in the Britain, we must consider many contributing factors. Geography, community and family have all been discussed but most prominent is the link between education and class, and the variations it produces (Reid 1998, Scott, 2002). Through both the Registrar General and NS-SEC scheme, class is determined by occupation, and occupation is largely determined by educational attainment (Reiss Jr. 1961).

Finally, looking back over the last 40 years of British employment, it is clear to see the unskilled and semi-skilled workers have traditionally been those to suffer worse at the hands of their white-collared counterparts. This has been the case in both of the major recessions detailed; however a main difference in inequality levels would be the aforementioned contributor, education. In 2010 more people than ever before are accessing higher education and obtaining the skills needed to survive in a new jobs market. Meaning that though the unskilled workers still suffer most, there are many fewer than there were 40 years ago.

Part Two of this essay details classic sociological ideologies in relation to Part One:

In many ways, employment can be said to define us. As a way of providing for ourselves, Michael Argyle (1992, p72) suggests that “work is a central, and essential, part of life”. However, as suggested there is much more to employment than the basic principles of providing food, shelter and protection; occupation has a close correlation with social status and class. Richard R. Hall (1975, p239-240) suggests that “In the absence of hereditary castes or feudal estates, class differences come to rest primarily on occupational position”. These notions have a place in a universal discussion, but in relation to Britain, the social division of class, and the research dimension of employment, they can begin to give an explanation of inequalities that exist.

“‘Class’ and employment have been sociologically linked from the ‘founding fathers’ onwards” suggests Rosemary Crompton (2010, p11). She summarises Karl Marx’s analogy of class as:

“The emergence, with capitalism, of a proletariat who had only their labour power to sell, exploited by the bourgeoisie who bought and controlled this labour” (Crompton 2010, p11)

Crompton goes on to identify basic similarities and differences between this point of view, and that of Max Weber:

“Like Marx, Weber identified the selling of labour as crucial to the definition of ‘class’, but specified a range of ‘market situations’ with which the sale of this differentiated labour was associated, associated with different levels of rewards and giving rise to different classes.” (Crompton 2010, p11)

When comparing these two “conflict” theories, we see that while both Marx and Weber consider employment to determine class, they do so by varying degrees. Marx describes a simple divide of those selling their labour, and those exploiting those selling their labour. Whereas Weber suggests that differing labours are rewarded with differing financial rewards, and that this is key in deciding whether people are nearer to being exploited, or exploiting others.

Finally, Crompton (2010) explains how these “academic and political commentaries” have led to official statisticians dividing up the occupational structure to create “employment aggregate class schemes”, such as the Registrar General or NS-SEC classifications.

Conversely to these conflict theories are the perspectives of sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, known as functionalists, who support the notion of “social meritocracy”. The idea that those with “merit” or the greatest skills rise to the top of the social ladder, and are appropriately rewarded, while those with the least will move down in a system known as “social mobility”. This view clearly relates to the Weberian notion of class stratification, but also links heavily with other aspects of class such as education: as those with the highest skills or merits are likely to have had the privilege of a good education, unlike many others. This is why Marxists would argue against social meritocracy and the social mobility theory, instead suggesting that such ideas are a fallacy implemented by capitalism with the aim of making the proletariat think they can become “embourgeoisied”, when really inequality is inherent within communities and families, and so the ability to move up through society is restrained by our ancestry.

In an article named “Social Mobility, not security” (2010) John Bird suggests that social mobility is “the only one cure for poverty” in the UK, rather than proletariat revolution Marx advocates. He agrees with Marx that a culture of poverty is bred into groups of society and that the welfare state confines them to remaining in these such groups, but says by giving these people “the encouragement to become independent … they can choose to live their lives the way they wish, rather than the way it has been foisted upon them”, suggesting that by cutting the working classes dependence on the state, it will increase their social mobility. The best example of this in action within the timeframe at hand would be the Conservative initiative of selling government owned social housing to tenants, in order to place them onto the property ladder and into the new free market; one of the few benefits felt by the working classes in the early days of Britain’s new economy.

Unemployment is of course key to the issue in hand. Many Marxists believe that unemployment is a constant feature of capitalism, benefitting the ruling class (bourgeois) and condemning the working classes (proletariats). Shane Jones of In Defence of Marxism (2004) writes: “There is no “natural” need for unemployment other than the need for greater profits to be made by the capitalist class.” This clearly relates to the period of structural unemployment in Britain through the 1980’s whilst large amounts of the working classes found themselves unemployed, as the “capitalist” class enjoyed the riches of the new open market.

Although Marx spoke of a “lumpenproletariat” or “rag proletariat”, the notion of an “underclass” is more in sync with the Weberian idea of class stratification.  The lowest class on the NS-SEC system, Class 8, describes its members as either: Never Worked, Long-term Unemployed or Long-term Sick. And although this category potentially contains contradictions ( for example, a long-term unemployed worker who for the 30 years previous has earned £100,000 a year), it is the proposed “underclass” which has suffered worst in terms of employment in Britain over the last 40 years.  The fact that national unemployment in Britain has only dropped below 5% on a couple of occasions between 1979 and 2010 (Trading Economics 2010), displays how the notion of an underclass can be supported. Those who failed to find reemployment following Britain’s deindustrialisation, particularly in areas with strong traditions of manufacturing and production can be seen, in large numbers, to have never returned to work. From a Marxist point of view, they have passed this trend on to generations to come, geographically concentrated, particularly in the north of England, displaying ancestral class inequalities (Crompton 2006, 2010; Bourdieu 1996; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993). Again this subject could be related to other sociological perspectives, with the functionalist notion of social mobility arguing that this group of people (the underclass), previously hard working and industrious, have been “suffering labour market disadvantage” (Lee and Turner 1996, p189) and as a result have sunk to the bottom of society, finally ending up “heavily stigmatised” and “live[ing] on the margins of society” (Macionis and Plummer 2008, p310).

When concluding the sociological theories and perspectives related to class and employment inequalities in Britain, it has been clear that the Marxist and Weberian ideologies have been most useful. In particular, Marx’s position on employment and Weber’s stance on class categories have led us to explore other avenues, such as structural unemployment and the development of an underclass in Britain. In relation to both of these conflict theories, the functionalist perspective has introduced opposing concepts such as social meritocracy and mobility.

Finally, the importance of the relationship between class and employment is summarised by Mike Savage (2000, p52) who complies with Weberian suggestions that broad class divisions can be related to income inequalities, but most importantly suggests that “this division is more marked than other possible categorical divisions”, ethnicity for example.

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